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Tension and Reconciliation in Canadian 
Contract Law Casebooks
DAVID SANDOMIERSKI*
Canadian common law contract law casebooks are beset with a tension. On the one hand, they 
all reveal a sustained commitment to the “wholesale assault on the jurisprudence of forms, 
concepts, and rules” that typifies American Legal Realism and its intellectual descendants. 
Concern with underlying values, functional reasoning, social realities, and policy thinking 
pervades the explicit messages of Canadian contract law casebooks and their editors’ 
related writings. On the other hand, the two casebooks most frequently assigned embody an 
allegiance to rules and courts that has a close kinship with the classical attitudes purportedly 
rejected. They convey a monolithic image of legal reasoning that emphasizes rules, certainty, 
and analogical reasoning and that marginalizes policy thinking. The range of skills, and 
image of lawyer, communicated by the books is much narrower than their critical and 
realist introductions imply. Accordingly, the casebooks suggest that Canadian legal thought 
may be typified by theoretical eclecticism coexisting with methodological homogeneity. 
This characterization provokes three alternative responses. First, casebook editors may 
embrace this vision and mount a principled defence of it. Second, they may reject it and 
aim to operationalize their realist and critical commitments into a more methodologically 
plural casebook, as has been done in the United States. Third, a re-imagined set of teaching 
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materials organized not around cases but around “empirically recurring problems of 
contracting parties” may transcend the paradigm. This last avenue holds the most promise 
for embodying a capacious vision of legal education.
Les recueils de décisions en droit contractuel en common law du Canada sont traversés 
par une tension particulière. D’une part, ils traduisent tous la volonté systématique de 
« combattre massivement la jurisprudence des formes, des concepts et des règles » 
dans la droite lignée du réalisme juridique américain et de ses héritiers intellectuels. Les 
inquiétudes relatives aux valeurs sous-jacentes, au raisonnement fonctionnel, aux réalités 
sociales et à la réflexion stratégique transparaissent dans les messages explicitement 
véhiculés dans les recueils canadiens de décisions en droit contractuel et les écrits connexes 
de leurs rédacteurs. D’autre part, les deux recueils les plus fréquemment étudiés témoignent 
d’un profond respect envers les règles et les tribunaux et d’un lien étroit avec les attitudes 
classiques soi-disant rejetées. Ils présentent une image monolithique du raisonnement 
juridique en mettant l’accent sur les règles, la certitude et le raisonnement analogique tout 
en marginalisant la réflexion stratégique. Les compétences et l’image des avocats, telles 
qu’elles sont transmises par ces recueils, sont bien plus restreintes que celles induites par 
leurs introductions critiques et réalistes. En conséquence, les recueils donnent à penser 
que la pensée juridique canadienne se caractérise par un éclectisme théorique qui cohabite 
avec une homogénéité méthodologique. Une telle caractérisation entraîne trois réactions 
différentes. Premièrement, les rédacteurs de recueils peuvent partager cette vision et la 
défendre de manière raisonnée. Deuxièmement, ils peuvent la rejeter et chercher à mettre en 
application leurs engagements réalistes et critiques dans un recueil de décisions mobilisant 
des méthodologies plurielles, comme c’est le cas aux États-Unis. Troisièmement, ils peuvent 
transcender ce paradigme en élaborant un ensemble réinventé de supports pédagogiques, 
qui ne s’articulerait pas autour de décisions judiciaires, mais plutôt autour de « problèmes 
empiriques rencontrés fréquemment par des parties contractantes ». Cette dernière option 
offre les meilleures chances d’établir une vision globale de l’éducation juridique.
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 INTRODUCTION
Contract law casebooks are a rich source of information about the messages 
communicated to students about what it means to think, work, and identify 
as lawyers.1 First year law school is a key moment in law students’ intellectual 
and professional formation, the year when they are purportedly transformed 
into people who can “think like lawyers.”2 Contract Law is a universal course in 
first year legal education3 and figures prominently in the popular culture about 
1. See Janet Ainsworth, “Law in (Case)books, Law (School) in Action: The Case for Casebook 
Reviews” (1997) 20:2 Seattle UL Rev 271 at 275.
2. See e.g. Elizabeth Mertz, The Language of Law School: Learning to Think Like a Lawyer (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
3. All Canadian common law faculties teach Contract Law or some variation thereof, in first 
year (e.g., Contracts and Judicial Decision-making at Dalhousie). The vast majority of US 
schools do so as well, with one notable exception being the functionally organized course in 
Bargain, Exchange, and Liability in Georgetown Law School’s Curriculum B. See Georgetown 
Law, “Curriculum Guide,” online: <apps.law.georgetown.edu/curriculum/tab_clusters.
cfm?Status=Cluster&Detail=105>. Historically, this was also the case throughout North 
America. See Alfred Zantzinger Reed, “Present-Day Law Schools in the United States and 
Canada” in Carnegie Foundation Bulletin No 21 (Boston: Merrymount Press, 1928) at 256.
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legal education.4 Perhaps most of all, contract law is a flashpoint for competing 
views of law—most of the major twentieth-century schools of legal thought 
has a prominent example in contracts scholarship.5 For all of these reasons, 
careful scrutiny of casebooks is warranted for understanding the “particular 
jurisprudential and normative belief systems”6 that the books may transmit. 
In the United States, scholars have embraced the contract law casebook 
as metonym for the shifting and turbulent terrain of legal thought. The first 
contracts casebook, by Christopher Columbus Langdell,7 is not only the origin 
of the ubiquitous case method, it also serves as one of the best concrete examples 
of “classical legal thought”—the nineteenth-century “consensus”8 view of law 
as unified, coherent, formal, and rational.9 Once the “age of anthology,” which 
4. See e.g. Scott Turow, One L: The Turbulent True Story of a First Year at Harvard Law School 
(New York: Farar, Straus & Giroux, 1977); The Paper Chase, 1973 DVD (Beverly Hills, Cal: 
20th Century Fox Home Entertainment, 2003).
5. For formalism, see e.g. Samuel Williston, ed, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts, vol 
1 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1903). For realism, see e.g. Arthur Linton Corbin, 
Corbin on Contracts: A Comprehensive Treatise on the Rules of Contract Law (St. Paul, Minn: 
West, 1950). For realism and functionalism, see e.g. LL Fuller & William R Perdue Jr, 
“The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1” (1936) 46:1 Yale LJ 52 [Fuller & Perdue, 
“Reliance Interest 1”]; LL Fuller & William R Perdue Jr, “The Reliance Interest in Contract 
Damages: 2” (1937) 46:3 Yale LJ 373 [Fuller & Perdue, “Reliance Interest 2”]. For Critical 
Legal Studies, see e.g. Jay M Feinman, “Critical Approaches to Contract Law” (1983) 30:4 
UCLA L Rev 829. For law and economics, see e.g. Anthony T Kronman & Richard A 
Posner, The Economics of Contract Law (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1979). For feminism, 
see e.g. Clare Dalton, “An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine” (1985) 94:5 
Yale LJ 997. For socio-legal studies, see e.g. Stewart Macaulay, “Non-Contractual Relations 
in Business: A Preliminary Study” (1963) 28:1 Am Soc Rev 55 [Macaulay, “Non-Contractual 
Relations”]. For relational theory, see e.g. Ian R Macneil, “The Many Futures of Contracts” 
(1974) 47:3 S Cal L Rev 691.
6. Ainsworth, supra note 1 at 274.
7. A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts: with a Summary of the Topics Covered by the Cases, 
2nd ed (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co, 1879).
8. David Kennedy & William W Fisher III, “Introduction” in David Kennedy & William 
W Fisher III, eds, The Canon of American Legal Thought (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2006) 1 at 8.
9. See Thomas C Grey, “Langdell’s Orthodoxy” (1983) 45:1 U Pitt L Rev 1 at 11; Duncan 
Kennedy, “Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of 
Classical Legal Thought In America, 1850-1940” (1980) 3 Res in L & Soc’y 3 at 8; Duncan 
Kennedy, “Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication” (1976) 89:8 Harv L Rev 1685 
at 1729 [Kennedy, “Form and Substance”]; Morton Horwitz, “The Rise of Legal Formalism” 
(1975) 19:4 Am J Legal Hist 251.
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Langdell ushered in, ended in the mid-twentieth century,10 casebooks were 
increasingly reviewed for the way editors “wear their heart upon their sleeve.”11 
Accordingly, casebooks signaled profound changes in attitude about legal 
thought. Lon Fuller’s “post-realist”12 innovation in 1947,13 Friedrich Kessler 
and Malcom Sharp’s “anticonceptualist”14 intervention in 1953,15 and Charles 
Knapp’s “humanist”16 take on the teaching matter in 197617 stand as three 
well-reviewed examples.18 
In Canada, meta-level discussion about the casebooks is less developed. While 
there are numerous thoughtful reviews of selected editions of Canadian contract 
law casebooks,19 there has been little attempt, if any, to draw high-level insights 
by looking at the books together and over the course of their development. This 
article attempts to do precisely that. I look at the prefaces and introductions 
10. See E Allan Farnsworth, “Contracts Scholarship in the Age of the Anthology” (1987) 85:6 
Mich L Rev 1406 at 1407.
11. Benjamin Kaplan, Book Review of Contracts: Cases and Materials by Friedrich Kessler & 
Malcolm Pitman Sharp, (1954) 63:7 Yale LJ 1039 at 1039.
12. Karl E Klare, “Contracts Jurisprudence and the First-Year Casebook,” Book Review of 
Problems in Contract Law: Cases and Materials by Charles L Knapp, (1979) 54:4 NYU L 
Rev 876 at 882.
13. Lon L Fuller, Basic Contract Law (St Paul, Minn: West, 1947).
14. Klare, supra note 12 at 884.
15. Friedrich Kessler & Malcolm Pitman Sharp, Contracts: Cases and Materials (New York: 
Prentice-Hall, 1953).
16. Klare, supra note 12 at 895.
17. Charles L Knapp, Problems in Contract Law: Cases and Materials (Boston: Little, 
Brown & Co, 1976).
18. See e.g. Malcolm Sharp, Book Review of Basic Contract Law by Lon L Fuller, (1948) 15:3 U 
Chi L Rev 795; Kaplan, supra note 11; Klare, supra note 12.
19. See e.g. Mary Hatherly, Book Review of Studies in Contract Law by Barry J Reiter & John 
Swan, eds, (1981) 30 UNBLJ 265; Linda Vincent, Book Review of Contracts: Cases, Notes 
& Materials by John Swan & Barry J Reiter, eds, (1979) 9 Man LJ 347; Richard F Devlin, 
Book Review of Contracts: Cases and Commentaries, 5th ed, by Christine Boyle & David R 
Percy, eds, (1996) 27:1 Can Bus LJ 144; David Vaver, Book Review of Contracts: Cases and 
Commentaries, 1st ed, by Christine Boyle & David R Percy, eds, (1979) 17:3 Alta L Rev 567; 
JA Manwaring, Book Review of Contracts: Cases and Commentaries, 2nd ed, by Christine 
Boyle & David R Percy, eds, (1982) Can Bar Rev 781; Christopher Carr, Book Review of 
Milner’s Cases and Materials on Contracts, 2nd ed, by SM Waddams, ed, (1971) 6:2 UBC L 
Rev 451; Clifford Ian Kyer, Book Review of Milner’s Cases and Materials on Contracts, 3rd 
ed, by SM Waddams, ed, and Contracts: Cases, Notes and Materials, by John Swan & Barry J 
Reiter, eds, (1978) 37:1 UT Fac L Rev 152. 
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of four published casebooks—one historical (Milner),20 three current (Swan,21 
Waddams,22 and Boyle/Ben-Ishai and Percy)23—to discern the explicit and implied 
messages about law, legal thought, legal reasoning, and legal practice. I compare 
20. JB Milner, ed, Cases and Materials on Contracts (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1963) [Milner 1st ed]; SM Waddams, ed, Milner’s Cases and Materials on Contracts, 2nd ed 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971) [Milner 2nd ed]; SM Waddams, ed, Milner’s 
Cases and Materials on Contracts, 3rd ed (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977) [Milner 
3rd ed]; SM Waddams, ed, Milner’s Cases and Materials on Contracts, 4th ed (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery, 1985) [Milner 4th ed].
21. John Swan & Barry J Reiter, eds, Contracts: Cases, Notes & Materials (Toronto: Butterworth 
& Co, 1978) [Swan 1st ed]; John Swan & Barry J Reiter, eds, Contracts: Cases, Notes & 
Materials, 2nd ed (Toronto: Butterworth & Co, 1982) [Swan 2nd ed]; John Swan & Barry 
J Reiter, eds, Contracts: Cases, Notes & Materials, 3rd ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 
1985) [Swan 3rd ed]; John Swan & Barry J Reiter, eds, Contracts: Cases, Notes & Materials, 
4th ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1991) [Swan 4th ed]; John Swan, Barry J Reiter & 
Nicholas C Bala, eds, Contracts: Cases, Notes & Materials, 5th ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 
1997) [Swan 5th ed]; John Swan, Barry J Reiter & Nicholas C Bala, eds, Contracts: Cases, 
Notes & Materials, 6th ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 2002) [Swan 6th ed]; John Swan, Barry 
J Reiter & Nicholas C Bala, eds, Contracts: Cases, Notes & Materials, 7th ed (Toronto: 
LexisNexis Canada, 2006) [Swan 7th ed]; Angela Swan, Barry J Reiter & Nicholas C Bala, 
eds, Contracts: Cases, Notes & Materials, 8th ed (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2010) [Swan 
8th ed]; Angela Swan, Nicholas C Bala & Jakub Adamski, eds, Contracts: Cases, Notes & 
Materials, 9th ed (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2015) [Swan 9th ed]. 
22. SM Waddams, M Trebilcock & MA Waldron, eds, Cases and Materials on Contracts 
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1994) [Waddams 1st ed]; SM Waddams, M Trebilcock & 
MA Waldron, eds, Cases and Materials on Contracts, 2nd ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 
2000) [Waddams 2nd ed]; SM Waddams et al, eds, Cases and Materials on Contracts, 3rd ed 
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2005) [Waddams 3rd ed]; SM Waddams et al, eds, Cases 
and Materials on Contracts, 4th ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2010) [Waddams 4th 
ed]; SM Waddams et al, eds, Cases and Materials on Contracts, 5th ed (Toronto: Emond 
Montomery, 2014) [Waddams 5th ed].
23. Christine Boyle & David R Percy, eds, Contracts: Cases and Commentaries (Toronto: Carswell, 
1978) [Boyle & Percy 1st ed]; Christine Boyle & David R Percy, eds, Contracts: Cases and 
Commentaries, 2nd ed (Toronto: Carswell, 1981) [Boyle & Percy 2nd ed]; Christine Boyle 
& David R Percy, eds, Contracts: Cases and Commentaries, 3rd ed (Toronto: Carswell, 
1985) [Boyle & Percy 3rd ed]; Christine Boyle & David R Percy, eds, Contracts: Cases and 
Commentaries, 4th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) [Boyle & Percy 4th ed]; Christine Boyle 
& David R Percy, eds, Contracts: Cases and Commentaries, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 
1994); Christine Boyle & David R Percy, eds, Contracts: Cases and Commentaries, 6th ed 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1999) [Boyle & Percy 6th ed]; Christine Boyle & David R Percy, eds, 
Contracts: Cases and Commentaries, 7th ed (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2004) [Boyle & 
Percy 7th ed]; Stephanie Ben-Ishai & David R Percy, eds, Contracts: Cases and Commentaries 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2009) [Ben-Ishai & Percy 8th ed]; Stephanie Ben-Ishai & David R 
Percy, eds, Contracts: Cases and Commentaries, 9th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2014) [Ben-Ishai 
& Percy 9th ed].
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what these editors say with what they do by looking at the remedies chapters 
of the current books. And, I situate this in a broader context of Canadian legal 
scholarly discourse by drawing on reviews of the casebooks, and other selected 
writings by the casebook editors. All of this analysis is informed by empirical 
research on the teaching of contract law in Canada—a study in which I have 
spoken with sixty-seven Canadian contract law teachers, including many of the 
editors themselves, and obtained course materials from them and eight others.
On the basis of this analysis, this article aims to make three distinct 
contributions. First is to elucidate the intellectual influences on the casebooks. 
All the major books in Canada owe a large intellectual debt to “canonical” 
American legal scholars who attacked the formalist consensus of the nineteenth 
century.24 Chief among these are the American Legal Realists. Canadian contract 
law editors articulate commitments to realist ideas that lawyers should seek to 
understand the “underlying values” of rules and doctrines, that they should 
reason purposively and functionally, that they should consider social realities of 
contracting, and that policy thinking is of central importance. The influences of 
Arthur Corbin, Lon Fuller, Grant Gilmore, and Ian Macneil figure prominently. 
Ideas from later schools also play a central role—legal process (concerns about 
institutional competence), law and economics, critical legal studies, socio-legal 
approaches, and feminist and race critiques of contract doctrine. The influences 
manifest differently in each of the books—sometimes incorporated into 
explicit argument (Swan), sometimes operating implicitly in editorial choices 
(Waddams), sometimes coalescing in a critical survey (Boyle/Ben-Ishai and Percy), 
sometimes appearing in a “Perspectives” chapter (Waddams). However expressed, 
the intellectual theories that explicitly frame the study of contract law in Canada 
largely derive from these American, critical traditions. Part I of the article sets out 
these influences and their manifestations in some detail.
Despite this surface commitment to realist and critical approaches, however, 
the two most frequently used casebooks, Boyle/Ben-Ishai and Percy and Waddams,25 
simultaneously pledge or embody an allegiance to rules and courts that has a 
close kinship with the classical attitudes purportedly rejected. Part II establishes 
this contradiction. Whether expressed as a commitment to “tradition” or simply 
presented without commentary, these books treat cases as the archetypal source 
of law, and legal reasoning as predominantly the exercise of distilling rules and 
24. References to the American “canon” in this article derive from the usage in Kennedy & 
Fisher, supra note 8.
25. As I detail at the outset to Part I, below, Waddams and Boyle/Ben-Ishai and Percy have, 
combined, about ninety percent market share in Canada.
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applying them to hypothetical fact situations in search of relevant similarities. 
This focus on rules and cases betrays an underlying commitment to the formalist 
values of coherence and consistency and tends to marginalize considerations of 
policy, politics, and social context. 
The third Part of this article explores three possible characterizations of this 
tension between realist/critical commitments, on the one hand, and classical/
traditional commitments, on the other. First, the tension may be understood 
as the result of external pressures, on the theory that editors would otherwise 
have sought to reduce the cognitive dissonance caused by the contradictions. 
After suggesting two such pressures—that editors are driven to depart from their 
“academic” inclinations toward realism by pressures from the “profession,” or the 
simple unavailability of alternative sources—I argue that on closer analysis the 
casebooks do not sustain either interpretation.
Alternatively, the tension may reflect “intellectual ambivalence”—the 
“simultaneous adherence to contradictory propositions.”26 On this interpretation, 
the commitments are acknowledged as contradictory, but this is not necessarily 
a sign of a failure to overcome external obstacles. Sustaining disparate ideas in a 
state of tension may instead signal a distinctive Canadian legal sensibility—the 
tendency for toleration, reflective of a legal culture characterized by the encounter 
of separate traditions. I leave this as a suggestion ripe for future inquiry, and 
suggest that in the end, a third characterization is most compelling.
The casebooks suggest that mainstream Canadian legal thought reflects 
a simultaneous commitment to theoretical eclecticism and methodological 
homogeneity, the refusal to “operationalize” its theoretical commitments into a 
vision of what it means to think like or practice as a lawyer. This characterization 
accounts for the tensions observed in Milner, Waddams, and Boyle/Ben-Ishai and 
Percy, and also for the fact that Swan, the one book that tailors its methodology to 
its theory, is the least adopted book. This observation signals a departure from the 
American tradition, in which legal reasoning is described as the “methodological 
sediment” laid down by successive periods of criticism and reform.27
I argue that this characterization compels one of three responses. If editors 
choose to reject it, then they ought to make a more thorough attempt to diversify 
the range of legal thinking skills and images of what it means to be a lawyer or 
legally-educated citizen in the books—to translate the theoretical eclecticism into 
a more methodologically plural casebook, as has been attempted in the United 
26. J LaPlanche & JB Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, translated by Donald 
Nicholson-Smith (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1973) at 26.
27. Kennedy & Fisher, supra note 8 at 3.
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States. If, on the other hand, they choose to embrace the characterization, then 
they ought to articulate and defend why one particular methodology deserves to 
be emphasized, and explain how this is consistent with a genuine commitment 
to a range of critical theories. In the end, I suggest that a third option might be 
best. After almost a century and half, it may be time for a set of contract law 
teaching materials that focuses not on judicial decisions but on parties’ actual 
contracting behaviour. It may be time, in other words, for the teaching materials 
to “complete” the digestion of legal realism into the academy and embody the 
transition from “law in books” to “law in action.”28 
A. METHODOLOGY
This review of casebooks is situated in a broader empirical study into the teaching 
of contract law in Canada, one that seeks to investigate the attitudes, goals, and 
practices of instructors of first-year Contract Law, taught in the common law 
tradition.29 The study as a whole is grounded in the “interpretive paradigm” 
of qualitative research, whose goals “involve empathetic understanding of 
participants’ day-to-day experiences and an increased awareness of the multiple 
meanings given to the routine and problematic events by those in the setting.”30 
I seek to discover what “meanings, symbols, beliefs, ideas, and feelings”31 professors 
hold or adopt about law, legal education, and legal practice, and compare these 
attitudes with teaching practices to determine the fit between aspiration and 
reality. First-year Contract Law serves as a case study for understanding the 
broader phenomenon of professional legal education. 
I situate my own legal theoretical commitments within the tradition of critical 
legal pluralism.32 But while the deeper motivation for this project lies in helping 
28. See Alfred S Konefsky et al, “In Memoriam: The Intellectual Legacy of Lon Fuller” 
(1981) 30:2 Buff L Rev 263; Roscoe Pound, “Law in Books and Law in Action” (1910) 
44:1 Am L Rev 12.
29. Seventy-five instructors from all common law faculties in Canada, plus the McGill Faculty 
of Law, have participated in my study. Of these, sixty-seven participated in a semi-structured 
interview and an additional eight have provided me with written course materials (syllabi, 
exams, reading lists, supplementary materials, etc). The data collection period spanned 
approximately four years: My first interview was on 26 February 2013 and my final interview 
was on 1 February 2017. 
30. Carol A Bailey, A Guide to Qualitative Field Research, 2nd ed (Thousand Oaks, Cal: Pine 
Forge Press, 2007) at 53.
31. Ibid. 
32. See Roderick A Macdonald & David Sandomierski, “Against Nomopolies” (2006) 57:4 N Ir 
Leg Q 610; David Sandomierski, “Legal Inquiry: A Liberal Arts Experiment in Demystifying 
Law” (2014) 29:3 CJLS 311.
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to realize legal education’s human and social potential, the methodological aims 
of the study are decidedly interpretive, and not “critical.”33 My main desire is to 
understand the complex phenomenon of contract law teaching.
Accordingly, throughout the study and in this article, I borrow from the 
techniques and practices of grounded theory. I aim to develop insight from the 
data themselves, “coding” for themes and relating these codes at increasingly 
higher levels of abstraction until a “theory” emerges.34 In this article, I mostly 
treat the casebooks as textual empirical data, analyzing the text in light of the 
themes of realism and formalism, and attempting to draw higher-level insights. 
To a lesser degree, I triangulate my textual analysis with the insights I have 
gained from the other sources of data in my study. Thus, I am able to draw 
parallels between what is written in the casebooks and what some law professors 
(including some editors) have told me in my interviews; I am able to make claims 
about the relative market share of each casebook; and I am able, in a modest way, 
to discuss how instructors actually use these casebooks. 
The sampled material includes the prefaces and introductory chapters of all 
historical and present editions of the casebooks, and the remedies chapter of the 
current editions of the three casebooks in print. I chose to analyze the prefatory 
and introductory passages because they contain the most explicit statements of 
the editors’ objectives and attitudes. I include one substantive chapter in order 
to compare what is said with what is actually done. I chose remedies because 
the subject matter incorporates realist and functionalist themes and because the 
decision about whether to include remedies first or last in a course has served 
as a longstanding proxy for debates between formalism and realism in the legal 
academy.35 I have reviewed all published scholarly reviews of the Canadian 
casebooks and use these, selected reviews of contract law textbooks and other 
writings by casebook editors, and the introductions to contract law textbooks, 
to inform my analysis.36
33. Methodologically, this study does not take “a macro approach to research.” I focus more on 
the individual participants in legal education than I do on institutions, curricula, or markets. 
I also do not “study a setting and its participants from a particular critical stance, such as 
feminism and Marxism” or focus particularly on “historical, social, and cultural events that 
extend beyond the setting.” Bailey, supra note 30 at 56. Compare HW Arthurs, “The Political 
Economy of Canadian Legal Education” (1998) 25:1 JL & Soc’y 14.
34. See generally, Anselm Strauss & Juliet Corbin, Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and 
Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory (Thousand Oaks, Cal: Sage, 1998).
35. See Scott D Gerber, “Corbin and Fuller’s Cases on Contracts (1942?): The Casebook That 
Never Was” (2003) 72:3 Fordham L Rev 595.
36. A significantly longer version of this study of Canadian contract law casebooks, incorporating 
more historical detail, is available on request.
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I. CRITICAL AND REALIST PERSPECTIVES IN CANADIAN 
CONTRACT LAW CASEBOOKS
One story of the Canadian contract law casebook might emphasize its American 
roots, portraying the first Canadian casebook, Falconbridge’s Law of Sales in 
1927, as an example of the importation of the US case method.37 This Part 
makes a somewhat different point. It seeks to highlight not so much the affinity 
or subtle differences between the countries’ approach to the case method,38 but 
rather to detail the influence on the Canadian books of American ideas that 
constituted the “assault” on the formalist ideas ascribed to casebook editors of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century.39 
The late 1970s is a flashpoint for the emergence of these ideas in Canadian 
casebooks. In 1978, two new casebooks came on the scene in Canada: Swan and 
Boyle and Percy. Each of these books has an extensive introductory chapter full of 
messages from American Legal Realism and subsequent critical theories of law, 
introductions that have been carefully edited up until their present editions. The 
third major casebook today, Waddams, traces its intellectual roots to 1977, the 
year that its editor, Stephen Waddams, published his realist textbook,40 The Law 
of Contracts,41 and completed his first major revision of Milner (3rd ed). This 
Part details the messages contained in the three casebooks, and in James Milner’s 
original introduction.
Before proceeding, some numerical context informs the largely idea-driven 
analysis that follows. Of the seventy-five participants in my study, fifty-eight 
assigned a commercial casebook, ten used original compilations of materials, and 
seven used or adapted a noncommercial in-house casebook. Of the fifty-eight 
who used commercial casebooks, thirty-two (55.2 per cent) assigned Boyle/
Ben-Ishai and Percy, seventeen (29.3 per cent) assigned Waddams, and nine 
37. See Angela Fernandez, “An Object Lesson in Speculation: Multiple Views of the Cathedral in 
Leaf v. International Galleries” (2008) 58:4 UTLJ 481 at 509. 
38. See e.g. Edouard Lambert & Max J Wasserman, “The Case Method in Canada and the 
Possibilities of Its Adaptation to the Civil Law” (1929) 39:1 Yale LJ 1.
39. See Grant Gilmore, Death of Contract (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1974) at 
14-17, 43-44 (on Williston and formalism); Williston, supra note 5 at iii-iv (acknowledging 
his “indebtedness” to Langdell).
40. See Part I(B)(ii)(a), below.
41. SM Waddams, The Law of Contracts (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1977) [Waddams, Law of 
Contracts 1st ed].
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(15.5 per cent) assigned Swan.42 Confidential sales data provided by the three 
publishers broadly confirms the relative weighting, with Ben-Ishai and Percy 
possessing a slightly greater market share than my numbers indicate. Between 
2011 and 2016, approximately two out of every three commercial contract law 
casebooks sold in Canada was a Ben-Ishai and Percy, one in four was a Waddams, 
and one in ten was a Swan.43 
A.  SWAN 
Swan is a good place to start for a few reasons. Because it sets out its realist messages 
so clearly, it provides a good intellectual basis for understanding the messages 
communicated in the other casebooks. Of the books, it is the most polemical; its 
explicit and powerful claims are particularly useful for review purposes. Where 
analogous claims are sketched in the other books, having foregrounded the Swan 
approach enables us to understand them in greater depth. Where the other books 
differ from Swan, the early immersion helps highlight the contrasts. Significant 
time is also spent here because unlike the other books, Swan does not demonstrate 
a host of contradictory views, and so it is not discussed in Part II. 
But it is also Swan’s outlier status that justifies a substantial focus. Unique 
among the books, Swan translates her44 theoretical commitment to realism 
42. For this metric, I count the casebook most recently assigned as of the date of first 
participation in my study (the interview date or, for non-interview participants, the first time 
they sent me their course syllabus). For most participants, this was the casebook assigned in 
the year of interview, but for the professors who were not currently teaching at the time of 
interview, it was the casebook most recently used. Most of these fall between the academic 
years 2012-13 and 2016-17; six were prior to 2011 (3 Waddams, 1 Boyle & Percy, 1 Original, 
1 Noncommercial). If these five are removed from the calculation, the relative percentages 
are: Ben-Ishai & Percy 61.5 per cent (31 out of 52), Waddams 26.9 per cent (14 out of 52), 
Swan 17.3 per cent (9 out of 52). In all, between February 2013 and January 2017 I invited 
109 current and former Canadian contract law professors to participate in my study. The 75 
who did participate yields a participation rate of 68.8 per cent.
43. Ben-Ishai & Percy is the recommended casebook for the Federation of Law Societies of 
Canada’s (FLSC) National Committee of Accreditation (NCA) examination in Contract 
Law, an examination that some foreign trained lawyers are required to take as a condition 
of being licensed in Canada. The FLSC has provided me with the number of annual sittings 
of the NCA Contract Law examination dating back to 2010. Casebook sales attributable to 
these sittings are not large enough to materially affect the ratio stated above.
44. Despite the fact that the book is a collaboration I attribute the casebook’s ideas to Angela 
Swan individually for ease of communication. This is also justified given that she is the only 
individual who has remained an editor for all nine editions. However, it should be noted that 
Swan attributes the ideas equally to herself and Barry Reiter. See Swan 4th ed, supra note 21 
at xxviii (“Neither of us now know who had which idea first. The work is a joint effort in the 
truest sense of the word”). Jakub Adamski replaced Reiter for the 9th edition. 
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into an operationalized methodological approach, focusing on the “role of the 
solicitor.”45 As Part II demonstrates, the other books are characterized by a 
methodology in tension with their realist commitments. So, Swan innovates. 
But, Swan is not only the least adopted commercial casebook in Canada, it has 
also provoked hostile responses.46 To make the general claim, as this article 
does, that the contradictions in the other casebooks suggest that there may be 
distinctive features of Canadian legal thought, Swan, the maverick outlier, serves 
as an instructive foil. 
1. THE SWAN VISION 
Irreducible to any singular influence and undoubtedly idiosyncratic, Swan 
nevertheless bears the influence of the American authors Corbin, Fuller, and 
Macneil. The section that follows details how these authors’ ideas have influenced 
Swan, how Swan has translated their ideas into the novel methodological focus 
on the solicitor’s perspective, and how the introductory and remedies chapters 
consistently execute this vision. 
I. THE REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF THE PARTIES
Unlike the other three books, Swan executes a vision of law that revolves around 
one central theme. This is the idea that the “fundamental purpose of contract 
law is the protection and promotion of expectations reasonably created by 
contract.”47 This central idea bears the direct influence of the great American 
legal realist, Corbin, who titled the first section of his magisterial treatise, “The 
Main Purpose of Contract Law Is the Realization of Reasonable Expectations 
Induced by Promises.”48 
45. Swan 3rd ed, supra note 21 at xxxi.
46. Numerous authors have bristled at the ideas set out in the “theoretical companion” to the 
casebook. Hatherly, supra note 19 at 270. See e.g. Gerald Fridman, Book Review of Studies in 
Contract Law by Barry J Reiter & John Swan, eds, (1981) 26:2 McGill LJ 408; David Percy, 
Book Review of Studies in Contract Law by Barry J Reiter & John Swan, eds (1981) 59:4 Can 
Bar Rev 853; Brian Coote, Book Review of Studies in Contract Law by Barry J Reiter & John 
Swan, eds (1981) 19:2 UWO L Rev 357.
47. Barry J Reiter & John Swan, “Contracts and the Protection of Reasonable Expectations” in 
Barry J Reiter & John Swan, eds, Studies in Contract Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980) 1 at 
6 [Reiter & Swan, “Reasonable Expectations”]. 
48. Corbin, supra note 5 at 1, quoted in Stephen A Smith, “The Reasonable Expectations of the 
Parties: An Unhelpful Concept” (2009) 48:3 Can Bus LJ 366 at 366. Corbin’s emphasis on 
pragmatism and “working rules” is also felt in Swan’s emphasis on usefulness. See Corbin, vol 
1, ibid at IV-V. 
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A number of other commitments flow from this idea. These include the ideas 
that contract law, and law in general, is purposive, functional, and instrumental;49 
that contract law can be evaluated according to its “suitability” to actual 
relationships;50 that legal institutions beyond courts, such as legislation and 
“administrative processes,” play a role in effecting change;51 that it is important 
to look “below the surface” to “identify and assess … principles and policies” 
that underlie cases and legislative instruments;52 and, ultimately, that the purpose 
of legal study can serve an “intensely practical” function, that is, to recommend 
more effective rules of (contract) law.53 These ideas, articulated in a “theoretical 
companion”54 to the casebook in 1980, would grow and develop over successive 
editions. As discussed below, they are significantly influenced by the ideas, and 
casebooks, of Lon Fuller and Ian Macneil.55 
II. FUNCTIONAL REASONING, POLICY, AND CONFLICTING VALUES
The theoretical basis for much of Swan’s vision is a rejection of positivism, what 
Swan and Reiter alternatively describe as an understanding of law divorced from 
goodness or badness,56 or the idea that one can “consider whether a particular rule 
of law exists or not, and discuss its application … without making any inquiry 
into the rule’s function.”57 Akin to Fuller’s expression that law is a “purposive 
ordering of human affairs,”58 Swan and Reiter write, in the second edition of the 
casebook, that law is:
justified only in so far as it forwards or participates in the achievement of social 
values. … It makes no sense to ask whether a rule exists as a separate inquiry from 
a consideration of the rule’s purpose and function. In fact, on this view a rule can 
really only be said to exist in so far as it does help to achieve some social goal.59 
49. Reiter & Swan, “Reasonable Expectations,” supra note 47 at 4. See also, Hatherly, supra note 
19 at 271; Vincent, supra note 19 at 349.
50. Reiter & Swan, “Reasonable Expectations,” supra note 47 at 5.
51. Ibid at 4.
52. Ibid at 2. See also, Percy, supra note 46 at 854.
53. Reiter & Swan, “Reasonable Expectations,” supra note 47 at 4.
54. Hatherly, supra note 19 at 270. 
55. Swan 1st ed, supra note 21 at vii.
56. Reiter & Swan, “Reasonable Expectations,” supra note 47 at 17.
57. Swan 2nd ed, supra note 21 at l.
58. Fuller & Perdue, “Reliance Interest 1,” supra note 5 at 52.
59. Swan 2nd ed, supra note 21 at li. Cf Swan 6th ed, supra note 21 at xxii (“The law is a tool for 
achieving social, economic and political ends”).
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This emphasis on functionalism is a typical expression of “policy” reasoning, 
the idea that law is a means to an end, that was a definitive feature of early 
American Legal Realism.60 Also reflecting the consensus in American legal 
thought (catalyzed by Fuller) that legal reasoning is typified by the balancing 
of “conflicting considerations,”61 the Swan editors repeatedly encourage their 
students to think critically about the role that judges have to play in balancing 
competing values.62 
III. THE SOLICITOR’S PERSPECTIVE 
As time goes on, Swan retains these realist ideas but treats them less theoretically.63 
Instead, they become operationalized into the signature feature of Swan today—a 
focus on the solicitor’s perspective. This perspective urges the student to place 
him- or herself in a planning state of mind, focused on avoiding litigation. The 
idea surfaces throughout the introduction and the book as a whole. It is heavily 
informed by the editors’ move from academia into practice, and the ideas of 
Macneil and Fuller. 
The solicitor’s perspective derives from a key critical message of the book, 
that the paradigm of adjudication is inadequate for a complete understanding of 
contract law. Early in the introductory chapter, the authors set the stage for this 
iconoclastic vision: 
The consequence of a focus on cases … tends to encourage one to think that we 
are concerned only about what happened (or might happen) in court: that every 
problem and issue should be approached as if it were going to be decided by a court. 
We believe that this introduces an unfortunate bias in developing an understanding 
of the law of contracts. The law of contracts is about agreements. … Any contractual 
dispute should therefore be regarded not as a common or everyday event, but as an 
unfortunate aberration. It is a much more important function of lawyers to keep 
their clients out of court than it is to engage in the process of litigation once the 
parties have chosen to bring their dispute before a court.64
60. Duncan Kennedy, “From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s 
‘Consideration and Form’” (2000) 100:1 Colum L Rev 94 at 113 [Kennedy, “From Will 
Theory”]. See also Felix S Cohen, “Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach” 
(1935) 35:6 Colum L Rev 809.
61. See Kennedy, “From Will Theory,” supra note 60 at 104.
62. See e.g. Swan 3rd ed, supra note 21 at xxxii-xxxiii; Swan 4th ed, supra note 21 at xxx.
63. For example, the third edition of Swan omits a three-page section on “Philosophical Ideas 
About Contract” that appeared in the second edition. Swan 3rd ed, supra note 21; Swan 2nd 
ed, supra note 21 at xlvii-l. 
64. Swan 3rd ed, supra note 21 at xxx-xxxi.
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This idea, and the related legal-process idea that the lawyer’s role is to 
choose the most appropriate “form of social ordering” for the circumstances, 
was a favourite of Fuller’s, who expressed it both theoretically65 and in his own 
contract law casebook.66
Closely related to the rejection of the backwards-looking, pathological 
perspective of litigation and adjudication is the embrace of a forward-looking, 
“healthy” vision of contractual relations.67 “Many solicitors,” the editors write, 
“spend a good deal of their time helping their clients manage the contractual 
relations they are in so that the relations run smoothly and disputes are avoided 
or dealt with before they become serious.”68 This represents an embrace of the 
theoretical ideas of Ian Macneil, who emphasizes contractual relations over 
discrete contracts,69 and construes planning70 and exchange as central organizing 
features of contract law.71 
The translation of these theoretical ideas into the focus on solicitors’ tasks 
is undoubtedly informed by the editors’ professional trajectory. Reiter had left 
the University of Toronto for practice as of the third edition and Swan had done 
so by the fourth. In the preface to the fourth edition, they remark how they are 
“pleased to find that our ideas seem to work very well when applied to the practical 
problems of advising clients and helping to make contractual relations work.”72 
After this time, the solicitor’s perspective receives new additional treatment in 
65. Lon L Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) 92:2 Harv L Rev 353 at 357 
[Fuller, “Forms and Limits”]. Kennedy refers to this article as Fuller’s “contribution to legal 
process thinking.” See David Kennedy, “Lon L. Fuller” in Fisher & Kennedy, eds, supra note 
8 at 217. See also Lon L Fuller, “What the Law Schools Can Contribute to the Making of 
Lawyers” (1948) 1:2 J Legal Educ 189 [Fuller, “Law School”].
66. See Lon L Fuller & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Basic Contract Law, 3rd ed (St. Paul, Minn: 
West, 1972) at 93-97.
67. See e.g. Swan 9th ed, supra note 21 at s 1.40. 
68. Swan 7th ed, supra note 21 at xxxii.
69. Ian R Macneil, The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1980) at 10 [Macneil, New Social Contract]. See e.g. Swan 
2nd ed, supra note 21 at xlv-xlvi; Swan 7th ed, supra note 21 at xxxi-xxxii. Mention of the 
distinction was removed in intervening editions.
70. Ian R Macneil, Contracts: Exchange Transactions and Relations – Cases and Materials, 2nd 
ed (Mineola, NY: Foundation Press, 1978) at ss 1.3.16ff (“Planning Through Contract”) 
[Macneil casebook].
71. Macneil, New Social Contract, supra note 69 at 4. See e.g. Swan 3rd ed, supra note 21 at xxvii.
72. Swan 4th ed, supra note 21 at xxviii. The editors also write that “almost none of the ideas that 
underlay the previous editions” have changed. Ibid.
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most successive editions.73 As the years go by and the casebooks increasingly 
incorporate references to clients’ actual practices and interests, the book begins 
to double as a work of socio-legal scholarship, marshaling actual experience to 
generate theory.74
IV. FAIRNESS AND DECENCY
Not only does the solicitor’s perspective implement the skepticism of adjudication 
and focus on planning and contractual relations, but it becomes a framework 
through which the editors can transmit some higher ideals about the justice 
system and legal profession. In speaking directly to students, they connect the 
idea of legal practice to a concern with fairness, decency, and human dignity:
[T]he most important aspect of any study of the law of contracts (or of any area of 
the law, for that matter) is the ability to retain a sense that the law is part of human 
life and that it must always respect human dignity. We have to retain an almost 
childlike faith that things must be fair. … Without this faith in fairness, law can 
easily become little more than an implacable and impersonal set of rules divorced 
from human values and based on some abstract idea of the need for certainty and 
predictability. Do not become cynical: there is too much at stake to risk the dangers 
of an unconcern for fairness and decency. Do not fall into the trap of thinking that 
it is somehow ‘unlawyerly’ to be passionately concerned for justice, or of believing 
that ‘to think like a lawyer’ means that one has to forget that one person who, until 
law school, did care that results be fair and that people behave decently towards each 
other.75
By inflecting what is “lawyerly” with a sense of ethics, the editors complete 
a picture of a lawyer as possessing a wide variety of skills and perspectives. The 
theoretical ideas of functionalism, multiple forms of social ordering, contractual 
relations, and empiricism translate into a view of the solicitor as a forward-looking 
facilitator of contractual relations, adept at planning and problem-solving. These 
skills considerably exceed the standard focus on parsing judicial opinions that 
we see in the other casebooks. Moreover, the editors consistently execute this 
perspective and the related ideas in the remedies chapter. 
73. See Swan 3rd ed, supra note 21 at xxxi, xxxiii; Swan 4th ed, supra note 21 at xxxiv; Swan 5th 
ed, supra note 21 at xxviii; Swan 6th ed, supra note 21 at xxix-xxx; Swan 7th ed, supra note 
21 at xxxii; Swan 9th ed, supra note 21 at s 1.41 (adding in a reference to “advising clients”).
74. Cf Macaulay, “Non-Contractual Relations,” supra note 5.
75. Swan 3rd ed, supra note 21 at xxxiii.
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2. THE SWAN REMEDIES CHAPTER: A CONSISTENT SET OF REALIST 
MESSAGES 
Like Fuller, who famously “innovated” the placement of remedies at the beginning 
of the casebook,76 the Swan editors place the subject matter immediately following 
the introductory chapter. In explaining their choice, they reinforce the solicitor’s 
role in prospective planning and avoiding litigation, and the importance of 
contractual relations, all against the background of an implicitly empirical claim 
about what lawyers actually do: 
Lawyers spend comparatively little time worrying about the process of contract 
creation. They spend much more of their time worrying either about the risks that 
the deal creates for their clients and the ways by which those risks may be avoided, 
controlled or allocated, or in negotiating the deal and keeping the arrangements 
working smoothly when the parties are in the deal or relation and need to co-operate.
It makes more sense to start the study of contract law by considering what might 
happen when things go wrong, what the risks of non-performance might be, where 
they come from and what one can do about them. Once one understands the rights 
that a party may have if a contract is not performed and the consequences of non-
performance of a contract, one has a better grasp of the problems that making a deal 
might create.77
The chapter goes on to de-centre the role of adjudication. Before any discussion 
of the cases, the Swan editors place the idea of remedies in their broadest possible 
ambit, analogous to the legal-process technique of cataloguing multiple forms 
of social ordering. They show how “remedies” can include criminal sanctions, 
formal and informal exclusion from a business or trade, being “publicly labeled 
as one who did not keep promises,” a court declaration that a contract has been 
breached, orders of specific performance, and, finally, court-awarded damages.78 
They also emphasize the pragmatic and functional view, at times with highly 
“practical” justifications—lawyers need to understand remedies so that they can 
decide whether “the amount likely to be recovered makes it worth starting or 
defending an action”79—other times with more lofty references to history and 
legal theory. They implicitly bolster the preference for “remedies first” by alluding 
76. Fuller, Basic Contract Law, supra note 13. On the book as an “innovation,” see Gerber, supra 
note 35 at 625; Farnsworth, supra note 10 at 1436.
77. Swan 9th ed, supra note 21 at ss 2.1-2.2.
78. Ibid at s 2.3.
79. Ibid at s 2.8.
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to the Blackstonian formulation that there is “no right without a remedy.”80 And 
they critique the theory that “law is a forum … for a confrontation between 
parties with ‘rights-based’ claims,” instead proposing an alternative that 
emphasizes “mutual duties and good faith” and “the expectations that the relation 
has encouraged.”81 They show contempt for the “doctrinal purity of the law,” 
preferring instead a focus on what “works.”82 
In addition to these more lengthy and explicit passages, the chapter is 
replete with other comments that reinforce the authors’ commitment to their 
view of law, which includes an appreciation of context,83 the importance of the 
reasonable expectations of the parties,84 functionalism,85 and the role of the 
solicitor.86 The functionalist view is reinforced by the organization of the chapter, 
whose main subject headings tend toward practical considerations instead of 
doctrinal divisions.87 
All of these examples generate a chapter in which the influences of Corbin, 
Fuller, and Macneil are felt equally strongly, if not more so, as compared with 
the Introduction. This consistency is unique among the three casebooks, 
as is the fact that these theoretical commitments are translated into a distinctive 
vision of the lawyer’s role as forward-looking, problem-solving, and focused on 
contractual relations.
80. Ibid at s 2.266. Cf William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 15th ed 
(London: Cadell & Davies, 1809) vol 3 at 109 (“it is a settled and invariable principle in the 
laws of England, that every right when withheld must have a remedy, and every injury it’s 
[sic] proper redress”).
81. Swan 9th ed, supra note 21 at s 2.435.
82. Ibid at s 2.456.
83. See e.g. Swan 9th ed at s 2.338 (“Throughout these materials we will confront the failure of 
the law to take into account the context of the contract”); ibid at ss 2.27-2.32, 2.33, 2.85, 
2.98, 2.122, 2.125(b), 2.3.7, 2.332-2.334, 2.339, 2.340, 2.402.
84. See e.g. ibid at s 2.125(a) (“If the focus of our inquiry is at least in part on what Cornwall 
Gravel reasonably expected from Purolator”); ibid at ss 2.331, 2.338, 2.435, 2.449(a). The 
theme also appears frequently in the case excerpts. See e.g. ibid at 115, 140, 159, 233.
85. See e.g. ibid at s 2.376 (“The question is, as always, what values and interests should the 
law support? What is the purpose of the legal rules about remedies?”); ibid at ss 2.63, 2.89, 
2.208, 2.389, 2.402, 2.429.
86. See e.g. ibid at s 2.148 (the solicitor is “professionally concerned to ‘foresee’ or worry about 
the consequences of a breach of contract”); ibid at ss 2.18, 2.24, 2.44, 2.47, 2.82, 2.84, 
2.108, 2.114, 2.126, 2.141, 2.283, 2.342, 2.385, 2.448(a), 2.490, 2.513(2), 2.513(3).
87. See ibid at paras 2.1 (“Introduction”), 2.2 (“The Compensation Principle”), 2.3 (“Some 
Problems in Awarding Damages”), 2.4 (“Equitable Remedies”), 2.5 (“Interest and the 
Date for Assessing Damages”), 2.6 (“Recovery of the Defendant’s Gains or Restitutionary 
Remedies”), 2.7 (“Reasonableness in the Face of Contract Breach: Accounting for Gains 
Arising from a Breach”).
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The remainder of this Part shows how many of these realist and critical ideas 
imported from American authors figure prominently in the other casebooks. But 
as the second Part will show, the other books fail to translate these commitments 
into their vision of legal reasoning. It is the nature of that contradiction that 
generates the analysis that follows in Part III. 
B.  WADDAMS AND MILNER 
The Waddams textbook and its predecessor, Milner, both bear the influence of 
the critical traditions of American legal thought—although as between the two 
casebooks, the influences are distinct, as are the means by which they manifest. 
While Milner has been out of print for over three decades, it remains relevant both 
as evidence of an intermediate intellectual link between Fuller and Angela Swan, 
and for the distance that can be observed between Milner’s views and those of 
Waddams. Milner emphasizes the legal-process views of Fuller, whereas Waddams 
departs from these, showing a closer affinity to early American Legal Realists. 
1.  MILNER 
James Bryce Milner published the first edition of his casebook in 1963. After 
Milner’s death in 1969, Waddams edited successive editions in 1971, 1977, and 
1985. In an introduction initially written in 1963, updated in 1968, and preserved 
throughout all four editions of the book, Milner sets out a “highly personal” 
approach to the study of contract law.88 This approach borrows heavily from 
the legal-process writings of Fuller. It undermines the centrality of adjudication; 
communicates skepticism about the Langdellian case method; and, like Swan, 
emphasizes the lawyer’s role in being a practical solver of clients’ problems.
The “great debt”89 that Milner claims he owes to Fuller is best indicated by 
Milner’s repeated claims—strikingly reminiscent of Swan’s—that legal education 
unduly emphasizes case law.90 That emphasis, for Milner, communicates a 
mistaken impression of what law is, what lawyers do, and what clients want. For 
Milner, cases do not serve as building blocks that “fit neatly into a little wall of law, 
88. Milner 1st ed, supra note 20 at xix.
89. Ibid at xx.
90. Compare ibid at xi (“First year law students can too easily get the impression that life in the 
law is just one continuous lawsuit. Case study falsely emphasizes this impression. The cases 
are almost always cases in courts, and the constant reading of cases may tend to drive out 
of mind the other areas in which law is equally operative”); Swan 3rd ed, supra note 21 at 
xxx-xxxi (“The consequence of a focus on cases … tends to encourage one to think that we 
are concerned only about what happened (or might happen) in court”).
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snugly and certainly;”91 instead, law is an exercise in serving human purposes, and 
justice the task of selecting which purposes to suppress and which to promote.92 
This emphasis on human purposes leads to a practical and prospective 
vision of the lawyer’s work, foreshadowing Swan’s solicitor’s approach: Instead 
of asking what a case stands for (a question that is a “virus” in Milner’s words), 
the “important question is: What is to be done with [it]?”93 Likewise, a client is 
unlikely to ask what the law “is” but rather what the client can “do, or not do in 
particular circumstances.”94 The lawyer’s task is, accordingly, to help the client 
“avoid trouble.”95 The lawyer accomplishes this best by adopting a forward-looking 
state of mind more akin to the legislative process than the adjudicative:
Their professional action will be based on their predictions, but it may take the 
form of, for example, drafting clauses in a contract, persuading an administrative 
official to vary a regulation, or a legislative committee to recommend an amendment 
to a statute, or organizing a new corporation. All of these activities are in a sense 
legislative, rather than adjudicative, and they justify, in my view, an even greater 
emphasis on the legislative area than our legal education presently offers.96 
The idea that legal education ought to emphasize the legislative process at 
least in equal proportion to the adjudicative is directly attributable to Fuller. 
A year before Milner would go to Harvard for his graduate legal education 
(1949), and shortly after Fuller’s time authoring an influential internal report at 
Harvard Law School on legal education to similar effect,97 Fuller published the 
article, “What the Law Schools Can Contribute to the Making of Lawyers.”98 
In it, he advocated for a new conception of legal education focused on legal 
process: Law schools should give equal emphasis to the two paradigmatic legal 
processes—adjudication, which had become the default focus of law schools, and 
legislation (which includes not only “planning and drafting of statutes” but also 
“negotiation and drafting of contracts and other private documents”).99 Milner 
not only read this article while at Harvard, but organized a graduate student 
91. Milner 1st ed, supra note 20 at vii.
92. Ibid at xvii.
93. Ibid at vii [emphasis added].
94. Ibid at xv.
95. Ibid at xvi.
96. Ibid at xvii.
97. See Robert S Summers, Lon L. Fuller (Stanford, Cal: Stanford University Press, 1984) at 15.
98. Supra note 65.
99. Ibid at 193.
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reading series at which Fuller presented it.100 Milner and Fuller would remain in 
correspondence for the subsequent two decades, and Milner would include this 
article in a list of recommended Fuller readings he shared with members of the 
Canadian judiciary.101 Milner would have also encountered a series of related102 
legal-process ideas in the Legislation Seminar he took with Henry Hart, architect 
of the Legal Process school.103 Indeed, Milner’s two highest grades were in Fuller’s 
Jurisprudence seminar and in Hart’s course.104
100. Memorandum from James Milner to “Fellow Graduate Students” (28 November 1949) York 
University Libraries, Clara Thomas Archives & Special Collections, James B Milner fonds 
(1992-014/005(161)) (“On Monday night Professor Fuller will lead off with observations 
on what law schools can contribute to the making of lawyers”); Letter from James Milner to 
Erin Griswold (Dean of Harvard Law School) (27 March 1950) York University Libraries, 
Clara Thomas Archives & Special Collections, James B Milner fonds (1992-014/005(161)) 
(“We owe a particular debt to Professor Fuller, who not only started the ball rolling at the 
first meeting, at which we discussed his article ‘What the Law Schools Can Contribute 
to the Making of Lawyers,’ but who also gave us continuous encouragement and advice 
throughout the year”). 
101. Letter from James Milner to Justice JL McLennan (19 Dec 1956) York University Libraries, 
Clara Thomas Archives & Special Collections, James B Milner fonds (1992-014/005(161)). 
Fifteen months later, Milner wrote, apparently unsolicited, to McLennan again, updating 
the bibliography. Letter from James Milner to Justice JL McLennan (27 March 1958) York 
University Libraries, Clara Thomas Archives & Special Collections, James B Milner fonds 
(1992-014/005(161)). Justice McLennan replied, noting that he shared the bibliography 
with Justice Rand of the Supreme Court of Canada. Letter from Justice JL McLennan to 
James Milner (31 March 1958) York University Libraries, Clara Thomas Archives & Special 
Collections, James B Milner fonds (1992-014/005(161)).
102. See William N Eskridge Jr & Philip P Frickey, “The Making of The Legal Process” (1994) 
107:8 Harv L Rev 2031 at 2039-40.
103. See generally Henry M Hart Jr & Albert M Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the 
Making and Application of Law (Westbury, NY: Foundation Press, 1994).
104. Milner received his highest grade, a 39.5 out of 50, in Fuller’s Jurisprudence Seminar. His 
second highest grade (39 out of 50) was in Hart’s Legislation seminar. See Harvard Law 
School, Examination Record of James Bryce Milner (June 1950) York University Libraries, 
Clara Thomas Archives & Special Collections, James B Milner fonds (1992-014/005(161)). 
Hart seems to have made an impression on Milner. As Milner wrote to Caesar Wright, 
“Hart’s idea is that legislation is a fancy name for legal method. I thought I was back in 
jurisprudence for five weeks.” Letter from James Milner to Caesar Wright (4 May 1950) York 
University Libraries, Clara Thomas Archives & Special Collections, James B Milner fonds 
(1992-014/005(161)). In an earlier letter, Milner told Wright that he viewed “Legislation 
as a jurisprudential and public law subject.” Letter from James Milner to Caesar Wright (20 
April 1950) York University Libraries, Clara Thomas Archives & Special Collections, James B 
Milner fonds (1992-014/005(161)).
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The influence of this article, which applies Fullerian concerns with multiple 
“forms of social ordering”105 and Hartian concerns of “institutional process” 
to legal education,106 is felt in Milner’s own distinction among legal processes and 
in his criticism of legal education as unequally weighted toward the adjudicative.107 
It can also be seen in the 1968 update to the casebook introduction (published 
posthumously in Milner 2nd ed), in which Milner reiterates the theme of 
institutional competence and his preference for the legislative.108 Intellectually 
speaking, Milner effects a transition from Fuller’s (and Hart’s) legal-process ideas 
to Swan’s focus on the solicitor: the presence of multiple forms of social ordering 
require an emphasis on the legislative mode, which embodies a forward-looking 
exercise in serving human purposes.109 This prospective activity translates 
into the practical objective of helping clients avoid trouble, and a view of law 
as contingent110 and instrumental to social ends (solving the “social problems 
of our time”).111 
2.  WADDAMS 
One aspect of this intellectual lineage—Milner overlapped with Swan on faculty 
at the University of Toronto for four years112—was apparently frayed once 
Waddams assumed ownership over the editorial vision of Milner. Unlike Milner 
105. Fuller, “Forms and Limits,” supra note 65 at 357ff.
106. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 102 at 2040. 
107. Milner 1st ed, supra note 20 at xi. 
108. Milner 2nd ed, supra note 20 at xxxi.
109. See Swan 1st ed, supra note 21 at vii (“Preface”). Swan acknowledges both Fuller’s influence 
and that of Hart (“Another very important influence on my thinking was the ‘Legal Process’ 
materials of Hart [& Sacks] … They provided me with a vehicle for fitting my views on the 
substantive law, initially of Conflicts and then Contracts, into a functioning legal structure.” 
Swan “never met Fuller. … [She] had hoped to meet him when he came to Ottawa once but 
family responsibilities prevented that and he died not long after.” Email correspondence from 
Angela Swan to author (19 October 2016). 
110. Milner 1st ed, supra note 20 at xvi, xvii (referring to the Cardozo quote that “law never is, but 
is always about to be” and calling it a “great idea”).
111. Milner 2nd ed, supra note 20 at xxx. Cf Swan 9th ed, supra note 21 at s 1.7 (“Law is the 
science of getting from here to there”).
112. After completing her BCL at Oxford, Angela Swan began as an Assistant Professor at the 
University of Toronto in 1965. Milner passed away in 1969. See Aird & Berlis LLP, “Bio, 
Angela Swan,” online: <www.airdberlis.com/people/bio/angela-Swan>. Swan “can remember 
some conversations with [Milner] about Fuller,” though they “never did talk much about 
Contracts.” Email correspondence from Angela Swan to author (19 October 2016).
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and Swan, Waddams expresses no skepticism about adjudication. In other ways, 
however, he demonstrates a shared affinity with his colleagues.113
I. A PRESENT-DAY CORBIN: MESSAGES FROM WADDAMS’S TEXTBOOk
Waddams begins to add his personal touch to Milner beginning with the third 
edition.114 He reorganizes the materials around the idea of a bargain, places a 
greater emphasis on reliance, and adds a new thematic chapter on the protection 
of weaker parties.115 In all of this, the casebook incorporates, and begins to 
resemble, the approach of his recently published textbook, The Law of Contracts.116 
Heralded as the arrival of “substantial critical analysis” to the Canadian contract 
law scene,117 a “success[ful]” attempt to “emulate Corbin,”118 The Law of Contracts 
emphasizes the concern for the function of rules over their form,119 for what 
judges do, and for policy analysis. These ideas surface both in substantive and 
prefatory remarks.
The textbook draws on an earlier article, “Unconscionabililty in Contracts.”120 
In it, Waddams argues that
[t]he law of contract, when examined for what the judges do, as well as for what they 
say, shows that relief from contractual obligations is in fact widely and frequently 
given on the ground of unfairness, and that general recognition of this ground of 
relief is an essential step in the development of the law.121 
113. Waddams, for example, participated in Reiter & Swan, Studies in Contract Law, supra 
note 47. See Hatherly, supra note 19 at 270 (Waddams and Swan “partake of a common 
philosophical perspective”).
114. See Milner 3rd ed, supra note 20 at vii (identifying the “significant change[s]” in the book); 
Milner 2nd ed, supra note 20 at Preface, unnumbered page (“the general object of the 
revision has been to bring the book up to date”). 
115. Milner 3rd ed, supra note 20 at vii. 
116. Waddams, supra note 41.
117. DA Soberman, Book Review of The Law of Contracts by SM Waddams, (1979) 17 UWO 
L Rev 314 at 315. See also Hugh Beale, Book Review of The Law of Contracts by SM 
Waddams, (1980) 15 J Soc’t Pub Tchrs L ns 139 at 139, 140. But see PFP Higgins, Book 
Review of The Law of Contracts by SM Waddams, (1979) 42:2 Mod L Rev 239 at 239 
(“The lay-out of the book appears to follow the orthodox lay-out of the established books 
on the subject”).
118. Soberman, supra note 117 at 315.
119. See Beale, supra note 117 at 140.
120. SM Waddams, “Unconscionability in Contracts” (1976) 39:4 Mod L Rev 1. See Soberman, 
supra note 117 at 317 (the textbook chapter is “drawn from” the article); Beale, supra 
note 117 at 140.
121. See Waddams, “Unconscionability in Contracts,” supra note 120 at 1.
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This intellectual strategy—conducting a comparative study of what judges do to 
argue both a descriptive and prescriptive point about a principle—is remarkably 
similar to that employed by Fuller and Perdue in their seminal articles on the 
reliance interest.122 Like the Fuller and Perdue articles, described as “perhaps 
the single most influential piece of Realist doctrinal work,”123 this strategy 
“disaggregat[es] and contextualize[s]” an issue and results in a “consequentialist 
policy orientation.”124
Waddams develops such themes in the preface to his textbook. He writes 
that the very “aim” of the book is to look “beyond surface rules of contract law 
to the conflicting principles that lie beneath.”125 This highlights the “conflicting 
values” at play in judicial decisions126 and helps to analyze the “changes that 
have occurred [in contract law] … with a view to suggesting what further 
changes seem desirable.”127 With the emphasis on underlying values, “conflicting 
considerations,” and policy reasoning, the preface to the textbook champions 
three key features of American Legal Realism.128 These presumably not only 
operate subconsciously on casebook editorial choices but are also incorporated by 
virtue of the numerous references to the textbook added in subsequent editions.129
II. REALISM AND FUNCTIONALISM IN THE REMEDIES CHAPTER OF 
WADDAMS 
The realist and functional themes surface in the remedies chapter, but unlike 
Swan, which explicitly and emphatically presents them as a preferred perspective, 
their presentation is both implied and non-polemical. 
122. See e.g. Fuller & Perdue, “Reliance Interest 2,” supra note 5 at 373 (“We have attempted 
to bring together for comparative study a series of situations in which judicial intervention 
has been (or in our opinion, should be) limited to a protection of what we have called the 
reliance interest”), 418 (“the contractual reliance interest receives a much wider (though often 
covert) recognition in the decisions than it does in the textbooks”).
123. Morton J Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal 
Orthodoxy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 184.
124. Ibid.
125. SM Waddams, “Preface to the First Edition,” reproduced in SM Waddams, The Law of 
Contracts, 6th student ed (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2010) at vii. 
126. Ibid.
127. Ibid at viii.
128. See Kennedy & Fisher, supra note 8; Kennedy, “From Will Theory,” supra note 60.
129. Milner 4th ed, supra note 20 at vii. The practice of referring to his textbook continues 
through to the present edition. See e.g. Waddams 5th ed, supra note 22 at 32, 35, 79, 89, 
106, 129, 135, 152, 154.
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As in Swan, the Waddams editors place the remedies chapter at the beginning 
of the book, although unlike Swan they do not articulate the rationale for this.130 
There are, however, numerous explicit references to the functional theme. 
An except from Fuller and Perdue’s reliance interest article131 is the first excerpt 
of the chapter, and the few commentaries that exist highlight the functionalist 
subjects of unjust enrichment132 and the constructive trust.133 Occasionally, 
notes and questions ask either explicitly or by implication for students to reason 
about policy.134 
Moreover, editorial choices highlight rules as contingent upon place, 
circumstance, or history, suggesting that underlying principles are more 
important than particular rule formulations. The first seven cases of the chapter, 
for example, come from England, Oregon, Ontario, New Hampshire, and 
Minnesota, with a note to a Kentucky case. Examples from other jurisdictions 
are often raised to demonstrate alternative formulations,135 as are dissenting and 
concurring opinions.136 The inclusion of the historical developments of rules137 
and the legal system138 amplifies the importance of context, as do the instances 
where the excerpts of cases are longer than in Swan,139 the paraphrasing of facts 
130. Indeed, the authors specifically write that they have designed the casebook “to be suitable 
for dealing with the material in several different orders,” whether starting with formation, 
remedies, or the theoretical perspectives. Waddams 5th ed, supra note 22 at iii.
131. Supra note 5.
132. Waddams 5th ed, supra note 22 at 158.
133. Ibid at 154.
134. See e.g. ibid at 53, 171 (“on the basis of what policy considerations can the recovery of profits 
made by Blake be justified?”).
135. See e.g. ibid at 53, 87 (different jurisdictions decide differently on whether the contract as a 
whole must be for peace of mind in order to award damages for mental distress), 122, 157.
136. See e.g. ibid at 120, 152.
137. See e.g. ibid at 55-6. Sometimes the cyclical nature of history is invoked to show how old 
rules may lose and regain favour at different historical moments. See e.g. ibid at 158. 
138. See e.g. ibid at 121 (history of the distinction between law and equity), 145 (origins of the 
tort of inducing breach of contract).
139. See e.g. ibid at 75ff (including Baroness Hale’s decision in Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator 
Shipping Inc (The Achilleas), [2009] 1 AC 61 (HL)), 145-151 (reproducing a long excerpt in 
Wroth v Tyler, [1974] Ch 30, [1973] 1 All ER 897, including many facts not germane to the 
ratio). By contrast, Swan paraphrases Wroth v Tyler in five paragraphs. Swan 9th ed, supra 
note 21 at ss 2.410-2.414. See also Waddams 5th ed, supra note 22 at 161 (providing a longer 
excerpt of Attorney General v Blake, [2000] UKHL 45, [2000] 4 All ER 385 than in Swan, 
one that provides more facts and context than does Swan’s paraphrasing of the facts. Swan 
9th ed, supra note 21 at 247.
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is more detailed and colourful than is necessary,140 and a postscript is provided 
about what happened after the resolution of the case.141 
III. SUMMARY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT IN WADDAMS 
Among the various techniques of legal thinking from the “critical” canon of 
American legal thought, early realist concerns with underlying values, functional 
reasoning, and policy are probably the best represented in Waddams. While the 
lack of explicit commentary makes this harder to discern, the editorial choices 
and occasional references imply a commitment to functionalism. In addition, 
the influence of his more explicit textbook is evident throughout: both by virtue 
of explicit cross-references and by virtue of the fact that many contract law 
professors consider Waddams to be the casebook’s controlling editor.142 Waddams 
is still very much Waddams’s, who still reproduces his realistic preface to the First 
Edition in the current edition of his textbook.143 
C.  BOYLE/BEN-ISHAI AND PERCY 
Compared to Swan and Waddams, Boyle/Ben-Ishai and Percy is more 
self-consciously collaborative and pan-Canadian. It took root following a 
conference of the Canadian Association of Law Teachers in the 1970s, “inspired 
by a widely held feeling that there was a need for a national casebook.”144 David 
Percy, of the University of Alberta, and Christine Boyle (of Windsor, then 
Dalhousie, then the University of British Columbia) assumed joint editorship 
of the book, with contributing editors of the other chapters representing the 
140. See e.g. Waddams 5th ed, supra note 22 at 112 (thoughtful paraphrasing of the facts in White 
& Carter (Councils) v McGregor, [1962] AC 413 (HL(Scot))), 141 (providing some colourful 
details about Warner Brothers Pictures v Nelson, [1937] 1 KB 209, [1936] 3 All ER 160 
[Warner Bros] derived from Bette Davis’s autobiography, The Lonely Life). 
141. See e.g. ibid at 44, reporting a post-judgment settlement in Groves v John Wunder Co (1939), 
286 NW 235, 205 Minn 163 (SC) [Groves].
142. See e.g. Interview of Instructor 017 (26 February 2013) at lines 532-33 (“I think of the 
[Waddams casebook] as mostly Stephen’s”; Interview of Instructor 029 (28 February 2014) 
at lines 525-26 (“I have been using Stephen’s casebook … ever since I started editing my 
chapter in it”); Interview of Instructor 044 (10 April 2014) at lines 85-86 (“I take Steve 
Waddams’ volume … he has all his co-authors”).
143. Waddams, “Preface to the First Edition,” supra note 125.
144. Ben-Ishai & Percy 9th ed, supra note 23 at v. Variants of this formulation appear 
in all editions.
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majority of common law faculties throughout the country.145 In the eighth 
edition, Stephanie Ben-Ishai of Osgoode Hall Law School replaced Boyle. She 
and David Percy took joint responsibility for the introductory chapter. Ben-Ishai 
also inherited the remedies chapter from David Mullan, who had inherited it 
from David Percy in the sixth edition. 
The introductory chapter under Boyle’s authorship celebrates a somewhat 
broader range of realist and critical voices than those canvassed in Swan and 
Waddams. That introduction, originally written by Boyle and revised by her up 
until the seventh edition,146 incorporates the influences of the American Legal 
Realists and their descendants: law and economics, critical legal studies, and 
socio-legal theorists.147 Also figuring prominently are perspectives from feminism 
and critical race theory and, reflecting a distinctively Canadian sensibility, 
references to First Nations people. When Ben-Ishai and Percy took over the 
chapter for the eighth and ninth editions, many of these perspectives were 
retained, although the presence of feminism and First Nations messages declined. 
In their place was a greater emphasis on substantive equality. In Ben-Ishai’s 
remedies chapter, realist commitments also surface. 
1. THE BOYLE INTRODUCTION
I. AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM … 
The chapter opens with comments and quotes that serve to undermine and 
render historically contingent the classical vision of law. Students are immediately 
told that law is “not made up of a static body of rules,” and the first section 
quotes from Gilmore’s argument in The Death of Contract that contract law is 
characterized by “alternating rhythms of classicism and romanticism.”148 The 
chapter discusses underlying values: students should not study law “without 
discussion of the value judgment inherent in any judicial discussion of legislative 
145. For example, the first edition lists fifteen different contributors from eight Canadian law 
schools and one Canadian Department of Law. Boyle & Percy 1st ed, supra note 23 at iii. 
The ninth edition lists 9 different chapter editors from six different Canadian law schools. 
Ben-Ishai & Percy, supra note 23. The University of Toronto, where both Swan’s and 
Waddams’s academic careers were headquartered, is not represented in any of the 9 editions. 
146. The introduction was attributed to Christine Boyle in Boyle & Percy 6th ed, supra note 23 at 
v-vi. Prior to that there was no attribution. 
147. For the lineage between legal realism and subsequent schools of thought, see Joseph William 
Singer, “Legal Realism Now,” Review Essay of Legal Realism at Yale: 1927-1960 by Laura 
Kalman, (1988) 76:2 Cal L Rev 465 at 465; Anthony T Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing 
Ideals of the Legal Profession (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1993), c 4.
148. Boyle & Percy 7th ed, supra note 23 at 2 (quoting Gilmore, supra note 39 at 102).
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rule,”149 and should look “behind” the words of judges.”150 The realist rejection 
of the public/private divide151 surfaces in the idea that “the free market is a form 
of government regulation in itself.”152 The theme of functionalism appears in the 
sample treatment of remedies.153
II. … AND ITS “HEIRS”
Messages from the “heirs” of legal realism154 also figure prominently. Jay Feinman 
is quoted twice, once to make the CLS point that law is a balance between 
altruism and individualism155 (describing modern contract law’s “attempts to 
balance the individualist ideals of classical contract with communal standards 
of responsibility to others”),156 and a second time to emphasize the ideological 
nature of contract law.157 Boyle also refers to Richard Posner’s “classic text” 
on law and economics and to Michael Trebilcock’s efficiency-based critiques of 
restraint of trade.158 
Critiques based on identity politics, including the categories of race, sexual 
orientation, and gender also arise. A section on “Freedom of Contract” marshals 
Ian Ayres’ work on gender and race discrimination in car sales,159 Boyle references 
a “gay-friendly approach,”160 and, most significantly, she develops an extended 
section on feminism between the fourth and seventh editions, culminating in a 
149. Boyle & Percy 7th ed, supra note 23 at 1.
150. Ibid at 6.
151. See Singer, supra note 147 at 477-95.
152. Boyle & Percy 7th ed, supra note 23 at 3. 
153. Ibid at 6-7.
154. Singer, supra note 147 at 504.
155. See Kennedy, “Form and Substance,” supra note 9.
156. Boyle & Percy 7th ed, supra note 23 at 5, citing Jay Feinman, “The Significance of Contract 
Theory” (1990) 58:4 U Cin L Rev 1283 at 1287-88.
157. Boyle & Percy 7th ed, supra note 23 at 8, citing Peter Gabel & Jay Feinman, “Contract Law as 
Ideology” in David Kairys, ed, The Politics of Law (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982).
158. Boyle & Percy 7th ed, supra note 23 at 7.
159. Ian Ayres, “Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations” 
(1991) 104:4 Harv L Rev 817.
160. Boyle & Percy 7th ed, supra note 23 at 11, quoting Craig W Christensen, “Legal Ordering 
of Family Values: The Case of Gay and Lesbian Families” (1997) 18:4 Cardozo L Rev 1299. 
This text appeared in Boyle & Percy 6th ed, supra note 23 at 5, and continues to appear in 
Boyle & Percy 9th ed, supra note 23 at 12.
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two-page survey of feminist thought,161 by far the most significant treatment of 
feminism of all the casebooks.162 Also unique among the Canadian casebooks, 
Boyle dedicates a little over a page to “First Nations and Treaties,” illustrating 
how treaties differ from conventional contracts and suggesting how a study of 
contract law can inform an understanding of the fiduciary obligation of the 
Crown and other issues of interpretation.163
Rounding out the survey of legal thought, Boyle also gives prominent place 
to theorists of relational contracts and insights from socio-legal scholarship. The 
very first sentence of the chapter is a quotation from Macneil, that the law of 
contracts is “an affirmation of the human will to affect the future” through the 
projection of exchange.164 Later, an entire section on Relational Contracts not 
only introduces students to Macneil’s concept,165 but also connects the concept to 
161. The first reference to feminism appeared in the 4th edition, where Boyle included just 
one short paragraph, noting that Dalton’s work on deconstruction drew on feminist 
methodology, but that “[i]t is too early yet for general themes to have emerged in the 
literature.” Dalton, supra note 5; Boyle & Percy 4th ed, supra note 23 at lxv. In the fifth 
edition, two paragraphs were added, largely highlighting feminist critiques of specific public 
policy problems (preconception contracts, cohabitation agreements, pay equity, domestic 
work, affirmative action). Boyle & Percy 5th ed, supra note 23 at lxxxii. The sixth edition adds 
a paragraph on feminist analyses that “have tended to be critical of contract law’s emphasis 
on the notion of exchange,” also highlighting that “[f ]eminist analyses have been critiqued 
in their turn … for failing to include perspectives drawn from lesbian legal theory.” Boyle 
& Percy 6th ed, supra note 23 at 6-7. The seventh edition adds three paragraphs, including 
long quotes, totaling almost a page. The main focus of these additions is on the exclusion of 
women from the “social contract,” with a counterpoint by Justice Bertha Wilson. Boyle & 
Percy 7th ed, supra note 23 at 8-9.
162. Swan has a short paragraph in which she refers to two articles. See Swan 9th ed, supra 
note 21 at s 2.253, citing Mary Joe Frug, “Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a 
Contracts Casebook” (1985) 34:4 Am U L Rev 1065 and Barbara Sullivan, “It’s All In the 
Contract: Rethinking Feminist Critiques of Contract” (2001) 18:2 Law in Context 112. 
Waddams reproduces an excerpt from just one article in the “Perspectives” chapter. Waddams 
5th ed, supra note 22 at 16, excerpting Gillian K Hadfield, “An Expressive Theory of 
Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract 
Law” (1998) 146:5 U Pa L Rev 1235.
163. Boyle & Percy 7th ed, supra note 23 at 11-12.
164. Ibid at 1. All editions, up to the present, commit the typographical error of writing 
“protecting exchange,” instead of “projecting exchange,” Macneil’s actual formulation. Boyle 
& Percy 9th ed, supra note 23 at 1; Macneil, New Social Contract, supra note 69 at 4.
165. Boyle & Percy 7th ed, supra note 23 at 10, citing Macneil, supra note 69.
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later chapters166 and considers several counterpoints.167 Since the second edition, 
the editors cite Stewart Macaulay to demonstrate that law may not be a significant 
mechanism for dispute settlement.168 And, also since the second edition, a “Final 
Word of Caution” concludes the chapter. This final word, reminiscent of both 
Swan169 and Milner,170 calls into question case law’s centrality and suggests a 
sociological alternative:
The student should realize that the emphasis on case law, especially appellate case 
law, is not the only way to study “law” and represents a particular focus which 
not all would accept as useful. One alternative would be to discover empirically-
recurring problems for contracting parties and examine the impact of the law on 
these problems, rather than allowing the choice of appropriate areas of study to be 
dictated by the lottery of litigation. Such an approach would concentrate on the 
total functioning of the law, that is, on the sociology of the law as a means of social 
control and as a mechanism for dispute settlement.171 
This final suggestion completes the picture of an approach that fundamentally 
challenges the tenets of classical legal thought: that law operates neutrally on all 
parties, that legal reasoning is distinct from political and policy argument, and 
that judicial formulations of rules based on the model of the discrete contract 
best govern the phenomenon of exchange.
2. BEN-ISHAI AND PERCY’S INFLUENCE
Ben-Ishai and Percy refine and reinforce the realist and critical messages advanced 
by Boyle. They do, however, communicate a slight shift in emphasis. In the place 
of Boyle’s extended emphasis on feminism and First Nations (Ben-Ishai and Percy 
abridge or remove the respective sections), Ben-Ishai and Percy communicate 
a concern for substantive equality in both their discussion and examples. The 
eighth and ninth editions do, however, contain new text with decidedly realist 
166. Boyle & Percy 7th ed, supra note 23 at 10 (referring to “Battle of the Forms”).
167. Ibid at 10, citing Melvin A Eisenberg, “Why There is No Law of Relational Contracts” 
(2000) 94:3 Nw UL Rev 805. See also Boyle & Percy 5th ed, supra note 23 at lxxxi, citing 
Patricia J Williams, “Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights” 
(1987) 22:2 Harv CR-CL L Rev 401.
168. Boyle & Percy 7th ed, supra note 23 at 6, citing Stewart Macaulay, “Elegant Models, 
Empirical Pictures and the Complexities of Contract” (1977) 11:3 Law & Soc’y Rev 507 at 
510. See also Boyle & Percy 2nd ed, supra note 23 at lvi.
169. 9th ed, supra note 21 at ss 1.38-1.40.
170. 1st ed, supra note 20 at xi.
171. Boyle & Percy 7th ed, supra note 23 at 13.
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influences; the impression is therefore not a distancing from, but a reorientation 
of, the critical project—toward a concern with distributive justice.172
For example, Ben-Ishai and Percy expand on the “freedom of contract” theme 
by adding a section on the common law response to freedom of contract. Here, 
they make the claim that judicial interventions have ensured that freedom of 
contract “was never perfectly realized”173—both “within the traditional categories 
of contract law” (citing Lord Denning as a cas typique) and in the creation of 
“general principles that transcend” the law of contract, such as the fiduciary 
principle174 and the doctrine of good faith.175 By emphasizing these judicial 
attacks on the pure laissez-faire model, they implicitly further the realist message 
that law is not distinct from politics, and that contract doctrine in particular 
“inescapably engages courts in making moral and public policy decisions about 
the legitimate distribution and use of power in the market place.”176 Moreover, 
in language resembling Waddams’ introduction to his textbook, they argue that 
the explicit recognition of these values by judges is important:
The covert use of traditional contract rules provides a measure of protection to 
the weaker parties, but in a manner that is often unpredictable and unsatisfactory 
and that can actually hide the real reasons for the decision. A failure by judges to 
openly discuss the real reasons for their decisions may mislead the appeal courts and 
commentators. … Moreover, there is a danger that the rule pressed into service to 
provide a fair result will itself be distorted. Subsequent applications of the distorted 
rule … may lead to arbitrary or unfair results.177
The concern with “weaker parties” may also reflect Ben-Ishai’s scholarly 
concern with substantive equality in the financial sector.178 This concern is 
also seen in the way in which she and Percy supplement the example of racial 
172. About half of the language in this section is taken from Chapter 11 of the seventh edition, 
written by David Percy (“Limits on the Pursuit of Self Interest: An Editor’s Comment”). 
Boyle & Percy 7th ed, supra note 23. One innovation of the eighth edition is to remove 
Chapter 11 and to foreground its ideas in the introductory chapter. On the role that Chapter 
11 played in the seventh edition, see Boyle & Percy 7th ed, supra note 23 at vi.
173. Ben-Ishai & Percy 9th ed, supra note 23 at 7.
174. Ibid at 8, citing Hodgkinson v Simms, [1994] 3 SCR 377, 117 DLR (4th) 161.
175. Ibid. The edition came out before the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Bhasin v 
Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71, [2014] 3 SCR 494 so does not include discussion of that case (which 
recognized an “organizing principle” of good faith in the common law) [Bhasin]. Compare 
Swan 9th ed, supra note 21 at ss 2.256-2.259 (reproducing Bhasin in the remedies chapter).
176. Singer, supra note 147 at 486.
177. Ben-Ishai & Percy 9th ed, supra note 23 at 7.
178. See e.g. Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Saul Schwartz, “The Role of Government as a Creditor of the 
Disadvantaged” (2010) 35:2 Queen’s LJ 539.
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discrimination in car sales with a study on racial discrimination in mortgage 
lending179 and incorporate an article on “bullshit” credit card agreements into the 
discussion on regulatory intervention.180 
3. BEN-ISHAI’S REMEDIES CHAPTER 
The remedies chapter, which Ben-Ishai also edits, is equally laced with references 
to legal realism and other critical perspectives. In some respects, these messages 
are even more prominent than in the other books. For example, where Swan 
significantly criticizes the law and economics theory of efficient breach,181 and 
where Waddams treats it rather neutrally, mentioning it but without commentary 
or emphasis,182 in Ben-Ishai and Percy, the related idea that “contract breach 
should be morally neutral” frames the chapter, positioned at the outset as the 
“dominant position.”183 Law and economics themes are treated uncritically 
throughout the chapter, for example by offering Posner’s critique of Groves v John 
Wunder Co without any critical response,184 presenting as fact without evidence 
the idea that economic efficiency accounts for the preference for damages over 
specific performance,185 or “assuming that most contractual parties will generally 
act in an economically rational way,” without defining “economically rational” 
or providing empirical support.186
That the editor imagines realist themes to be central to the remedies 
chapter is also signaled by the fact that the very first learning objective listed 
at the beginning of the chapter is that students will “[a]rticulate and assess the 
general policy considerations influencing judicial decisions.”187 Questions and 
179. Ben-Ishai & Percy 9th ed, supra note 23 at 5, citing RD Marico, “The Higher Cost of 
Being African-American or Latino: Subprime Home Mortgage Lending in New York City 
2004-2005” (2007) NYLS Legal Studies Research Paper No 07/08-12.
180. Ben-Ishai & Percy 9th ed, supra note 23 at 4.
181. See Swan 9th ed at ss 2.399 (deliberate efficient breach conduct is rare because parties want 
to preserve their reputation), 2.428 (efficient breach can have no impact on long term 
relational contracts). See also, ibid at ss 2.88, 2.396, 2.406.
182. Waddams 5th ed, supra note 22 at 106, 172.
183. Ben-Ishai & Percy 9th ed, supra note 23 at 792. The first two excerpts in the chapter are from 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, with his “bad man” quote, and Richard A Posner. See ibid at 793, 
reproducing Holmes, “The Path of the Law” (1897) 10:8 Harv L Rev 457; Richard A Posner, 
Economic Analysis of Law, 6th ed (New York: Aspen, 2003).
184. Ben-Ishai & Percy 9th ed, supra note 23 at 833; Groves, supra note 141.
185. Ibid at 937.
186. See e.g. ibid at 938. Reference is made to Ian Macneil’s argument critical of efficient breach, 
but only by way of citation, not discussion. Ibid at 794.
187. Ibid at 791.
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commentary emphasize how policy considerations are “obscured by verbal 
formulae”188 and ask students to conduct policy reasoning.189 The related idea 
that contract law embraces the balancing of competing values also surfaces.190 
Moments where the editor emphasizes the importance of bench composition,191 
or suggests that judges use flexible formulations or engage in contestable 
interpretations to arrive at ends they deem appropriate192 would seem to reflect 
a realist concern with judicial background and psychology.193 As with Swan, 
the student is invited to consider the practical motivations of clients194 and to 
imagine the practice of law as transcending the barrister’s mode to include that 
of the solicitor.195 All of this is interspersed with references to popular culture196 
and accessible everyday examples197 that serve to ground the material in students’ 
direct and familiar experience. 
Combined, these references give the impression that the editor of the chapter 
is skeptical of the idea that contract law doctrine is a closed and coherent system 
of abstract rules determinable by ratiocination. These references convey the 
impression that contract law is better understood through a realistic appreciation 
of underlying factors, be they judicial preference, client demands, the balancing 
of values, ideology, or policy considerations. This slate of messages reproduces 
elements from the “skeptical” tradition of American legal thought.198 
188. Ibid at 880. 
189. See e.g. ibid at 833 (“Should the deliberate nature of the defendant’s breach have had any 
influence on the approach of the majority?”), 889, 934.
190. See e.g. ibid at 791 (“the study of contractual remedies offers an introduction to values in 
contract law such as efficiency and morality”), 934.
191. See ibid at 890 (calling “noteworthy” the change in the composition in the Manitoba Court 
of Appeal between two cases).
192. See ibid at 890 (“the obvious flexibility of the principles of Hadley v Baxendale [(1854), 
9 Exch 341, 156 ER 145] allows courts to impose liability when it seems appropriate”), 930.
193. Cf Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1930).
194. See e.g. Ben-Ishai & Percy 9th ed, supra note 24 at 805 (client motivations make reliance 
damages a salient jurisprudential issue), 950 (speculating about Bette Davis’s motivations in 
Warner Bros, supra note 140).
195. See e.g. ibid at 921 (“How could the drafting of the clause in this case be 
improved?”), 928, 934. 
196. See ibid at 837, referring to the film The Paper Chase, supra note 4 to introduce Hawkins v 
McGee, 84 NH 114, 146 A 641 (1929). 
197. See e.g. Ben-Ishai & Percy 9th ed, supra note 23 at 837.
198. Kennedy & Fisher, supra note 8 at 6.
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D. SUMMARY OF PART I: “ALL REALIST NOW”
In reflecting these concerns, Boyle/Ben-Ishai and Percy resembles the other three 
casebooks in rejecting classical legal thought and embracing legal realism and 
related scholarly traditions. The American influence is omnipresent, by virtue 
of the direct citation of many leading American authors, but also via the general 
realist sensibility. This sensibility may at times be explained by the editors’ direct 
experience—Milner, Percy, and Ben-Ishai all spent time studying in the United 
States. More likely, however, it probably reflects deeper commitments about 
the nature of law and what it means to be a lawyer. The careful and deliberate 
editorial decisions reflect an underlying commitment to the idea that beneath 
the words of judges are a diverse range of factors, all of which contribute to the 
lawyer’s eclectic toolkit. On the basis of what these editors say, and how they 
structure their casebooks, it would not seem inapposite to apply the US aphorism 
and declare that Canadian contract law casebooks are all “realist now.”199
II. THE TRADITIONAL FLIP SIDE: RULES, COURTS, AND 
LEGAL REASONING
At the very same time, the two most commonly used casebooks in Canada, Boyle/
Ben-Ishai and Percy and Waddams, demonstrate an apparently contradictory 
tendency. Despite the scholarly commitments to realist and critical ideas that 
clearly inform the editing of these casebooks, a “traditional” undercurrent, 
which emphasizes the centrality of rules and the importance of adjudication, 
produces a series of opposing messages that vie for primacy. These messages recall 
the formalist, classical ideas about law that the editors purportedly reject. They 
include the idea that law is the domain of a distinctive and internal rationality, that 
policy thinking and interdisciplinary perspectives are marginal to legal reasoning, 
and that the job of the lawyer is to apply rules to facts, paradigmatically before a 
court. Section II.A sets out how the casebooks and related writings by the editors 
convey these ideas and II.B outlines how readers of the casebooks and other 
related writings have received them. 
199. See Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale 1927-1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1986) at 229; Singer, supra note 147 at 465. 
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A. MESSAGES CONVEYED BY THE CASEBOOKS
1. ANALOGICAL REASONING
The types of questions the editors of Waddams and Ben-Ishai and Percy ask in 
their remedies chapters reinforce the conventional image of legal reasoning as 
analogical, “reasoning by example,” in which the determination of “relevant” 
similarity is the most important intellectual task.200 In both books, the editors 
mine the facts of cases to tease out similarities and differences to encourage 
students to ask whether there are “rational grounds” for distinguishing cases.201 
Similarly, students are asked to make comparisons between the facts of cases and 
hypothetical or counterfactual scenarios—whether in general terms or as part of 
the requirement to “advise” hypothetical clients.202 
2. THE IMPORTANCE OF RULES
This continual return to reasoning by example not only cultivates the type of 
thinking that many argue is distinctive to the legal discipline,203 it also reinforces 
the centrality of rules to law and legal reasoning. As Lloyd Weinreb notes, 
the dialectical technique of asking whether a particular rule applies to varying 
hypothetical facts constitutes the pursuit of an “increasingly precise enunciation” 
of the rule, working toward a “correct statement of the law.”204 And indeed, rules 
play an extremely important role in the remedies chapters. In Waddams, many 
200. See Edward H Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1949) at 1-6; Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal 
Reasoning (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2009) at 94.
201. See e.g. Ben-Ishai & Percy 9th ed, supra note 23 at 836, 856, 862, 890 (contrast Scyrup 
v Economy Tractor Parts Ltd (1963), 43 WWR (Man CA) with Munroe Equipment Sales 
Ltd v Canada Forest Products (1961), 29 DLR (2d) 730 (Man CA)—are there rational 
grounds for distinguishing the case?), 928, 930; Waddams 5th ed, supra note 22 at 35, 45, 
60 (“Is the distinction valid? Should a distinction be made between a carrier, a seller, and a 
manufacturer?”), 123, 171.
202. See e.g. Waddams 5th ed, supra note 22 at 32, 36, 44, 53, 79, 111, 120 (“Advise client. 
Would it make any difference if client’s repudiation was based on expert advice … ?”); 
Ben-Ishai & Percy 9th ed, supra note 23 at 813, 817, 828, 836, 880 (“Would the answer be 
different depending on whether the plaintiff was claiming damages based on expectation or 
reliance interest?”), 902, 943.
203. See e.g. Lloyd L Weinreb, Legal Reason: The Use of Analogy in Legal Argument (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), c 1; Schauer, supra note 200, c 5; Levi, supra note 
200. But see Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, Demystifying Legal Reasoning (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 3 (“legal reasoning is ordinary reasoning applied to 
legal problems”).
204. Weinreb, supra note 203 at 144.
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of the questions following cases invite students to focus on rules, whether to 
clarify, evaluate, or elaborate upon them.205 In Ben-Ishai and Percy, the editors 
ask students to distil rules or tests to demonstrate comprehension,206 and model 
this skill by frequently distilling the readings into discernable take-aways, often 
in the form of rules. The editors summarize cases,207 scholarly articles,208 and 
even the entire law of contractual remedies209 in this way, and some passages 
in the commentary simply set out rules or principles in the same manner as a 
conventional treatise might.210 Moreover, six of the eight learning objectives use 
action words that presume a fixed rule or other knowledge base: four hope that 
students will “describe and apply” legal rules, one that students will be able to 
“calculate” damages, and another that students will be able to “explain” what 
types of losses are compensable.211 
3. THE MARGINALIZATION OF POLICY
The serious way in which rules are treated in the casebooks contrasts with the 
realist predilection to discount their importance, a tendency colourfully illustrated 
by Karl Llewellyn’s hyperbolic claim (subsequently mollified) that rules are 
nothing but “pretty playthings.”212 And yet, not only do the casebooks emphasize 
the rules, they implicitly treat them as more important than underlying policy 
rationales. In numerous instances in both casebooks, the cases reproduced raise 
interesting policy issues ripe for discussion, but the editors fail to take them up, 
205. See e.g. Waddams 5th ed, supra note 22 at 35, 45, 60, 123 (Carter v Long & Bisby (1896), 
26 SCR 430, [1896] SCJ No 48—an excerpt that just provides the rule), 171.
206. See e.g. Ben-Ishai & Percy 9th ed, supra note 23 at 883 (“What are the two limbs of the 
remoteness test in Hadley v Baxendale, [supra note 140]?”) 887, 933.
207. See e.g. ibid at 826 (Chaplin v Hicks, [1911] 2 KB 786, [1911-13] All ER 224 “illustrates 
that courts are not prevented from awarding expectancy damages just because there is an 
element of guesswork in assessment”), 893-94.
208. See e.g. ibid at 795 (outline of the three types of damages as a prelude to Fuller 
& Perdue), 803.
209. See ibid at 792.
210. See e.g. ibid. at 894, 902 (the general rule is that the loss will be assessed at the earliest date 
the plaintiff can be expected to mitigate).
211. Ibid at 791.
212. KN Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: Some Lectures on Law and its Study (New York: Oceana, 
1930) at 5, quoted in Schauer, supra note 200 at 131; KN Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: 
On Our Law and its Study, 2nd ed (New York: Oceana, 1951). 
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preferring more conventional discussion about legal reasoning.213 The questions 
that do invite policy-related thinking are often, in the case of Ben-Ishai and Percy, 
vague and open-ended formulations—“should” X be the case, do you “agree,” 
which choice do you “prefer,” “how” should X be justified214—or, in the case 
of Waddams, framed in the most general terms possible (“on the basis of what 
policy considerations …”).215 Little guidance is given to the reader as to what 
considerations, empirical information, standards, or reasoning techniques might 
be useful in making policy arguments. In this casual reference to policy, we see 
a tendency similar to the one identified among US contract law teachers to treat 
policy discussions as unrigorous and anecdotal in contrast to the tight, technical 
treatment of conventional legal reasoning.216 
4. THE CENTRALITY OF ADJUDICATION
The emphasis on conventional legal reasoning is closely connected to the idea 
that judicial decisions are the best source of information to inculcate such skills. 
Beyond the trite and obvious point that all four casebooks remain “case” books, 
reproducing mainly judicial decisions, is the fact that the editors themselves 
speak in such a way as to suggest that studying adjudication is the most effective 
means of conveying legal rationality. The best and most explicit example of this 
among the editors is the following comment by Waddams in the Preface to his 
textbook, The Law of Contracts: 
So long as we value rationality in decision making we shall continue to require that 
like cases should be decided alike and that there should be a rational distinction 
between cases that are decided differently. I do not believe that these ends can be 
otherwise realized than by an impartial tribunal giving reasons subject to appeal.217 
213. See e.g. Waddams 5th ed, supra note 22 at 112 (fact pattern about whether a married woman 
who was sold tranquilizers instead of birth control should have “mitigated” the loss flowing 
from an unwelcome child by getting an abortion or giving the child up for adoption: only 
“Advise client,” no discussion of broader issues), 112, 126 (no discussion of why a court may 
be reticent to supervise an ongoing order), 151; Ben-Ishai & Percy 9th ed, supra note 23 at 
917 (introduction to liquidated damages fails to include the central policy consideration that 
militates against enforcing penalties), 929 (policy rationale for refusing to enforce penalty 
clauses as explained in Elsley v JG Collins Ins Agencies, [1978] SCR 916, 83 DLR (3d) 1 not 
taken up by editors), 925, 937.
214. See e.g. Ben-Ishai & Percy 9th ed, supra note 23 at 889, 920, 817, 825, 856, 880, 901.
215. Waddams 5th ed, supra note 22 at 171.
216. See Mertz, supra note 2 at 76-77.
217. Waddams, “Preface to the First Edition,” supra note 125 at vii-viii.
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While this final line could be read as simply making the point that 
adjudication, as “a device which gives formal and institutional expression to 
the influence of reasoned argument in human affairs, … assumes a burden of 
rationality not borne by any other form of social ordering,”218 it appears to go 
much further than this. Not only does it state that rationality cannot be realized 
“otherwise” than through adjudication, but Waddams makes a blanket assertion 
that some undefined collectivity (“we”) values rationality for reasons unstated. The 
implied claim is to a professional or disciplinary consensus about the importance 
of analogical reasoning, presumably on the basis of the rule-of-law idea that 
law should treat everyone equally (and thus that there should be “rational” 
distinctions justifying differential treatment).219 These convictions manifest 
themselves in the presentation of cases as speaking for themselves throughout 
Waddams, with minimal commentary, and in the many references to analogical 
reasoning detailed above. 
5. THE “TRADITIONAL,” UNPROBLEMATIZED “CORE” OF LEGAL STUDY
In Boyle/Ben-Ishai and Percy an analogous phenomenon is at play. We encounter 
it explicitly for the first time at the very beginning of the Introduction, when 
the editors state that the focus of the book will be on the “basic skills associated 
with the analysis and use of case law,” and “the application of rules and principles 
to hypothetical fact situations.”220 But it is also evident in the two references 
to the “traditional” approach adopted by the book. This surfaces first in the 
Preface, where the editors write (as they have since the first edition) that the 
“materials and their organization are somewhat traditional, for they are designed 
to constitute the basis of a core course in contracts.”221 Similar to Waddams, the 
concept of “core” is not explained, but rather assumed: There is an implied claim 
that the traditional materials (cases) are central (core), and that other approaches 
would be peripheral. This impression is reinforced by the caveat placed at the 
end of the Introduction. At the very end of the “word of caution” in which 
the editors float the approach of discovering “empirically-recurring problems for 
contracting parties” and concentrating on the “sociology of the law,” the editors 
peremptorily dismiss the idea: “Although this approach is not adopted here, our 
218. Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,” supra note 65 at 366.
219. For a paradigmatic articulation of the rule of law, emphasizing the importance of common 
law judges, see AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 4th ed 
(London: Macmillan, 1893) at 173-93, 334-41.
220. 9th ed, supra note 23 at 1.
221. Ibid at vi; Boyle & Percy 1st ed, supra note 23 at v.
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contributors preferring to concentrate on the inculcation of skills associated with 
more traditional materials, it is important to remember that this has significant 
limitations, dictated by the objective chosen.”222 This move, which one reviewer 
has called an exercise in “confession and avoidance,”223 reinforces the sense that 
traditional skills and materials—analogical reasoning as modeled by judicial 
reasons for decision—constitutes the unproblematized core of legal study. That 
this comes at the end of the highly developed critical review is all the more striking.
B. MESSAGES RECEIVED BY READERS
These messages observed in the language of the casebooks—the centrality of 
rules and courts, an emphasis on conventional legal reasoning and “tradition” 
at the expense of policy and other legal processes—also figure prominently in the 
accounts of the messages “received” by readers of the casebooks. Boyle and Percy, 
in particular, has been the subject of three critical reviews, highlighting many of 
the themes above. And while Waddams has curiously been less reviewed, a review 
of Waddams’ introductory book, Introduction to the Study of Law, suggests how 
his writing may communicate to beginning law students a vision of law in direct 
tension with his scholarly commitments. 
1. MESSAGES RECEIVED FROM BOYLE AND PERCY 
Reviewers of Boyle and Percy highlight its kinship with classical legal thought. For 
these reviewers, the emphasis on “tradition” translates into a concern with logic, 
deduction, the marginalization of policy, and decontextualization reminiscent 
of Langdellian legal science. David Vaver, in a review of the first edition, says 
that the book “correctly”224 self-identifies as traditional, and that the book’s “real 
difficulty” is with its philosophy:
The impression I got is that contract law is a relatively static subject which looks for 
its solutions to an internally generated logic. … The format of case followed by notes 
and questions repeated ad nauseam is good as far as it goes, but gives the erroneous 
impression that contract law is a purely deductive art with the occasional statutory 
incursion to mar its inexorable internal logic.225
Similarly, John Manwaring, who writes that the second edition reminds him 
of his grandmother’s “traditional black shoes,” argues that it fails to live up to its 
222. Boyle & Percy 7th ed, supra note 23 at 13.
223. Devlin, supra note 19 at 149.
224. Supra note 19 at 567.
225. Ibid at 571-72.
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potential of debunking formalism. While Manwaring approves of the “traditional 
design” of placing formation first in the book, in part because it permits students 
to first understand and then gradually problematize the “formal logic of the law 
of contracts,”226 Manwaring writes that the book fails to avoid the danger of 
presenting the law of contracts as “a system of scientific rules to be deduced from 
certain basic principles or premises,”227 and asserts: 
The weakness of the book is precisely that the issues are raised in the introduction and 
not adequately integrated into the discussion of doctrine. … After the introduction, 
these issues are either never mentioned again, or mentioned in a perfunctory note. 
The student will quickly get the message: the study of law involves the study of cases. 
The rest is just gloss. It is not really law but merely policy. … Thus, the decision to 
structure the book according to the categories of the formal logic of contract law 
gives the impression that formalism is still tenable after all these years. … [W]hat 
would have been an important step forward in Canadian casebook design if done 
with the requisite sophistication becomes a step backwards into history.228 
Richard Devlin, reviewing the fifth edition, similarly highlights the 
marginalization of critical ideas that results from a traditional understanding of 
what a “core” course of contracts should look like. He details how the book fails 
to adequately incorporate the critical messages of the introduction into the other 
chapters, which tend “to focus on the micro details of [their] particular subject 
area.”229 In particular, he bemoans the “decontextualizing (and depoliticizing) 
tendency” of certain chapters: “Certainty of Terms” and “Representations and 
Terms” fail to identify the interpretive framework of “ideological dispositions” 
despite a cursory reference, and the chapter on frustration ignores critical 
scholarship that elucidates where “economic powerless(ness) and the ideologies 
of contract law come into sharp relief.”230 And while issues of race and gender 
fare better, representing “significant progress in the process of modernizing and 
contextualizing contract law,” these issues are ultimately “ghettoized” by being 
characterized, for example, “as ‘women’s issues’ and therefore marginal.”231 
The failure of the editors to encourage the contributors to explicitly 
incorporate these critical ideas represents a “curious surrender of editorial 
influence” that deprives the book of a “greater intellectual depth and stronger 
226. Manwaring, supra note 19 at 784-85.
227. Ibid at 785.
228. Ibid.
229. Devlin, supra note 19 at 146.
230. Ibid at 146-47.
231. Ibid at 147.
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thematic coherence.”232 It also, however, contributes to the messages of 
marginalization. By leaving it to instructors to supplement the “core” casebook 
with their own materials, it can lead some students to “resist on the basis that 
it is not real law and they are only being forced to study these issues because 
of the subjective preferences of the individual teacher.”233 Devlin argues that 
the “basics” and “core” should be considered “contestable and contingent upon 
certain material and ideological presumptions.”234 To a certain degree, Devlin 
exemplifies this possibility when, after having been invited to edit the chapter 
on frustration in the sixth edition, he includes in it the concept of social force 
majeure.235 However, even after having taken on the chapter, he still impliedly 
retains his critique of the overall book as having an “overwhelming emphasis … 
on relatively traditional doctrinal discussion and analysis.”236 
2. MESSAGES RECEIVED FROM WADDAMS
Criticism has also been leveled at Waddams for portraying a view of law that 
constructs an uncritical “core” of law and legal reasoning, impliedly discounting 
or marginalizing the exogenous perspectives of policy, politics, and context. 
To a certain extent, we see this in reviews of Waddams’ editions of Milner, 
as when Christopher Carr lamented that the second edition “neglects” a critical 
and functional approach to contract law,237 or when Ian Kyer described the third 
edition as fitting “comfortably into the traditional mold.”238 But, curiously, there 
appears to be no review of Waddams in the scholarly literature. Accordingly, 
this section focuses on a review of his primer, An Introduction to the Study of 
Law, a venue where Waddams attempts to explicitly convey features of law to 
incoming students. It, too, was first published in the late 1970s.239
232. Ibid at 148.
233. Ibid at 149.
234. Ibid.
235. Boyle & Percy 6th ed, supra note 23 at 688-92.
236. Richard Devlin, Anthony Duggan & Louise Langevin, “Doing Theory in First Year 
Contracts: The Iceberg Method” (2007) Can Legal Educ Ann Rev 1 at 1, n 18 (citing Boyle 
& Percy as one example for this proposition). 
237. Carr, supra note 19 at 458-59; ibid at 461 (“It is lacking in editorial comment, analysis, and 
criticism, it raises few questions about the subject-matter, and it is particularly deficient in its 
failure to refer to leading articles and comments on the various topics and cases”).
238. Kyer, supra note 19 at 153. 
239. (Toronto: Carswell, 1979).
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I.  INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LAW: RODERICk MACDONALD’S 
CRITIQUE
Most reviews of Introduction to the Study of Law, the first such Canadian 
primer, were positive, if brief.240 By contrast, Roderick Macdonald’s review in 
the University of Toronto Law Journal is lengthy and critical. The review has 
two parts: first, he focuses on the text to discern the attitudes about law, legal 
education, and the role of the lawyer that are “implicit” in the materials.241 
Second, he reports on the “explicit and implicit views picked up by students” 
on the basis of his own “canvass [of ] the reactions of those who have read it as a 
preparation for law school.”242 Macdonald’s review is important for two reasons: 
it generates an impression, however caricatured, of the underlying attitudes about 
law communicated by Waddams’ writing. Also, by highlighting the fact that the 
received messages are apparently in contrast with Waddams’ own legal thought, 
it highlights the complex nature of the tensions within pedagogical texts in 
Canada, a theme explored in greater depth in Part III.
On the basis of his textual analysis, Macdonald argues that the “fundamental 
orientation” of the book243 conveys the idea that
law and justice are separate concerns, that justice is relative and often not capable of 
rational discovery, and that equity, fairness, and justice militate against a law which 
is stable, certain, and predictable … 
Waddams appears to suggest that it is not only desirable, but also possible, for judges 
simply to apply the law, … justifying their judgments by an appeal to a pre-existing 
law which can be objectively determined.244
In portraying Waddams as committed to the separation between law, which 
is objective and discoverable through reason, and justice, which is relative, 
Macdonald is unsubtly associating Waddams with classical claims to legal 
240. See Alan Pratt, Book Review of Introduction to the Study of Law by SM Waddams, (1979) 
37:2 UT Fac L Rev 270 (praising the book’s “economy and wit”); Ken Norman, Book 
Review of Introduction to the Study of Law by SM Waddams, (1980) 45:1 Sask L Rev 171 
at 172-73 (highlighting the book’s “style and manner,” “currency and pertinence,” and 
its having “adequately circumnavigated the world of what law is, who lawyers are, how 
they think, and why law teachers behave as they do”); Roger Bilodeau, Book Review of 
Introduction to the Study of Law, 3rd ed, by SM Waddams, (1988) 67:2 Can Bar Rev 394 (a 
“concise and complete picture of how Canada’s legal system operates”).
241. RA Macdonald, Book Review of Introduction to the Study of Law, 3rd ed, by SM Waddams, 
(1981) 31 UTLJ 436 at 437 [Macdonald, Review].
242. Ibid at 444.
243. Ibid at 438-9.
244. Ibid at 439, 440.
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science.245 He also highlights this idea when he describes Waddams’s “traditional 
view of law, legal problems, and the lawyer’s role.”246 
Macdonald goes much further when he describes a series of propositions 
and corollaries derived from students’ reactions to the primer. These include 
the primacy of adjudication, the objective nature of law, and law’s distinctive 
disciplinary reasoning. Macdonald enumerates them as follows:
1. All law happens in courts: a/ the adversarial, adjudicative processes of the 
common law are the best, if not the only way for a legal system to operate; 
b/ all other societal decision-making agencies, including legislatures, perform 
a minor role in the Canadian legal system; c/ hence, the lawyer’s principal 
preoccupation is with reading and analyzing cases and in preparing for court.
2.  … 
3. Law is a distinct discipline with its own internal logic: a/ concerns such as 
justice, morality, economic efficiency, and social practice are only marginally 
related to the business of determining the law; b/ law can be compartmentalized, 
and legal practice is largely a matter of finding the correct rule to apply ...
4.  … 247
On the one hand, this interpretation simply states in unadorned fashion 
many of the observations made above about the casebook’s (and textbook’s) 
predilection for conventional legal reasoning and the importance of courts. On the 
other hand, the Macdonald interpretation would seem to run expressly counter 
to Waddams’ realist ideas that underlying values need to examined, that “the 
foundations of even the most firmly established rules are being undermined,”248 
and that it is what judges do, in addition to what they say, that matters.249 The 
marginalization of “justice, morality, economic efficiency, and social practice” 
that Macdonald observes would equally seem to contradict the instrumental 
and purposive philosophy of law ascribed to Waddams by Reiter and Swan,250 
245. And indeed, the separation goes back even further, to the idea that “for law we have a 
measure. … Equity is according to the conscience of [the] Chancellor.” Schauer, supra note 
200 at 123, citing John Selden, Table Talk of John Selden, Frederick Pollock ed (London: 
Quartich, 1927).
246. Macdonald, Review, supra note 241 at 441. See also, ibid at 443.
247. Ibid at 445.
248. Waddams, “Preface to the First Edition,” supra note 125 at viii.
249. Waddams, “Unconscionability in Contracts,” supra note 120 at 1.
250. Reiter & Swan, “Reasonable Expectations,” supra note 47 at 2 (“We all believe that the law, 
and this includes the rules governing contracts, is and should be instrumental. That is, the 
law attempts to support particular principles and to promote particular policies, and this 
purposive aspect of the law is both desirable and inevitable”). See also, supra note 113.
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Waddams’ functional approach in his textbook, and his later nuanced claims 
about the interdependence of policy and principle in contract law.251
Macdonald seems to intuit this apparent divergence when he writes:
It is nowhere suggested that the author himself would subscribe to any of these views 
implicit in his manual. He may, in fact, reject them all. Nevertheless, they are all 
perspectives that intending law students who read the book gained from it. They are 
all perspectives which, one suspects, any reader of Introduction to the Study of Law 
would develop.252
The idea that there may be a gap, if not outright contradiction, between the 
commitments held by an author and the messages received by the reader, brings 
into sharp relief the main problem posed by this Part. How are we to characterize 
the apparently contradictory set of messages in Boyle/Ben-Ishai and Percy and 
Waddams? What might account for these tensions? And what do they say about 
Canadian legal education and Canadian legal thought? Part III offers some 
preliminary thoughts in response to these questions.
III. CHARACTERIZING THE CONTRADICTION
The cohabitation of realist and critical messages, on the one hand, and traditional 
or classical ideas, on the other, can give rise to a number of characterizations. 
First, one might think that external pressures have compelled editors to act in 
ways inconsistent with their genuinely held beliefs. Second, one could conceive 
of this co-presence of ideas as reflecting genuine ambivalence: editors believe 
two contradictory things at the same time. Third, the commitment to realist or 
critical ideas, expressed via traditional means, may be reconciled by reference to a 
distinctive feature of Canadian legal thought. This Part argues that while all three 
possibilities merit future investigation, the final possibility may be the richest.
251. See e.g. SM Waddams, Principle and Policy in Contract Law: Competing or Complementary 
Concepts? (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 227-28. See also SM 
Waddams, Dimensions of Private Law: Categories and Concepts in Anglo-American Legal 
Reasoning (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
252. Macdonald, Review, supra note 241 at 450.
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A. EXTERNAL PRESSURES
One way of understanding the tension is that the expressed commitments to 
realism demonstrate a genuine belief, whereas the commitments embodied by 
what the editors do reflect the influence of external pressures. This conception 
would be supported by the notion that healthy minds seek to reduce dissonance,253 
and that had the editors been able to do so, they would have consistently 
executed their beliefs.
1. THE FAMILIAR TROPE: THEORY VS PRACTICE, ACADEMY VS 
PROFESSION
The first candidate of an external pressure relates to the timeless and “fierce” 
debate between the academy and the profession.254 On this view, the critical and 
realist ideas reflect the theoretical and academic commitments of the authors, 
but pressures from the profession have compelled a more traditional execution.
There are two reasons why this familiar trope does not map particularly well 
onto the realities of the casebooks. First, Swan, the book that communicates 
realist messages most consistently, is the book in which the editor’s identity as 
practitioner is most highly developed and internalized. This fact suggests the 
converse inference: responsiveness to the demands of the profession may be 
more conducive than a purely “academic” approach to doing what one says 
about legal realism.
 Second, rather than highlighting the dichotomous vision of theory and 
practice, the casebooks tend to reinforce their mutually reinforcing qualities.255 
All casebooks combine scholarly analysis and articles with notes and questions in 
253. See Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, Cal: Stanford 
University Press, 1957).
254. See generally C Ian Kyer & Jerome E Bickenbach, The Fiercest Debate: Cecil A Wright, 
the Benchers, and Legal Education in Ontario (Toronto: The Osgoode Society, 1987); 
HW Arthurs, “The Tree of Knowledge / The Axe of Power: Gerald Le Dain and the 
Transformation of Canadian Legal Education” (2012) Osgoode Hall Law School 
Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy Research Paper No 25/2012 at 5, online: 
<digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=clpe>; Task 
Force on the Canadian Common Law Degree, Final Report, October 2009 (Federation of 
Law Societies of Canada, 2009); American Bar Association Task Force on the Future of Legal 
Education, Report and Recommendations (2014: American Bar Association), online: <www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/report_and_
recommendations_of_aba_task_force.authcheckdam.pdf>.
255. Cf Kronman, supra note 147. For a discussion of other “integrative” views, see David 
Sandomierski, “Training Lawyers, Cultivating Citizens, and Re-Enchanting the Legal 
Professional” (2014) 51:4 Alta L Rev 739 at 744-54.
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which students are asked to “apply” principles to problems. In the two books that 
refer explicitly to practice, Swan and Milner, the ideas are treated as conciliatory. 
Swan’s focus on usefulness derives from the realist theory of law as instrumental; 
conversely, her empirical concern with clients’ actual needs translates into a 
theoretically developed notion of the “reasonable expectations of the parties.” 
In this, Swan may be more thoroughly influenced by Macneil’s casebook than the 
passing reference in the Preface to the first edition of Swan might suggest: Macneil 
specifically rejects the separation of “policy, justice, and practice” in his book.256
Likewise, Milner’s Fullerian commitment to law (and life)257 as a process 
informs equally his academic quest to understand law and his invocation to 
students to consider how they may be useful to their clients. Milner, teaching at 
the University of Toronto in the decades following the “fiercest debate” between 
the Law Society of Upper Canada and the Faculty of Law, could have easily 
reproduced this tension; instead, his incorporation of practical and academic 
virtues in his introduction258 implies that that the oppositional story may not so 
much represent truth as it is a “history written by the winners.”259 
2. THE CAPABILITY (AND UNAVAILABILITY) PROBLEMS
The other possible external factor is the lack of availability of sources other than 
case law. Just as judges are only capable of solving certain types of problems, there 
may be a “capability problem” of case law,260 and the traditional focus on legal 
reasoning may simply result from the natural limits of the judicial case as primary 
pedagogical source. While this analysis is one that I accept and expand upon in 
the Conclusion, I do not believe that the unavailability of sources accounts for 
editors’ choices. This is so for two reasons.
256. Macneil casebook, supra note 70 at xix. Macneil writes:
I do not believe that policy, justice and practice can … be separated. The deep currents both 
of social justice and of social injustice flowing through our exchange-oriented socioeconomic 
system manifest themselves in every “practical” contract question. At the same time, no one 
unfamiliar with the “practical” world of contracts can fully understand the exchange currents 
of social and economic policy flowing so strongly through our society and its legal system.
257. Cf Fuller, “Law School,” supra note 65 at 204 (focusing on process is “metaphysically sound”: 
“Life is itself a process, and by making process the center of our attention we are getting 
closer to the most enduring part of reality”).
258. Milner 1st ed, supra note 20 at xiii-xiv (exalting university study in his discussion of the 
tendency to ask whether a case is “rightly decided”).
259. RCB Risk, “My Continuing Legal Education” (2005) 55:3 UTLJ 313 at 313.
260. Cf Richard Danzig, The Capability Problem in Contract Law (Mineola, NY: 
Foundation Press, 1978).
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First, the casebook authors could have emphasized a broader set of legal 
reasoning skills than they do, even on the basis of cases. “Case in context studies” 
can highlight historical and other contextualizing factors;261 party behaviour 
and motivations can be inferred from appellate judgments; and “case files” can 
foreground problem-solving skills.262 Only Swan does this as a central feature of 
the book, by invoking the solicitor’s perspective; the other authors occasionally do 
it, demonstrating their awareness of the possibility, but it is a marginal practice.263 
Second, the editors themselves do not state, argue, or even bring to 
consciousness the possibility that they are constrained. Boyle could have easily, and 
much more persuasively, justified the preference for a more traditional approach 
by arguing that she simply did not have access to “empirically-recurring problems 
of contracting parties.”264 Instructors sympathetic to the sociological approach 
do make such arguments.265 Swan presumably has access to such information 
by virtue of her law practice, and would be well placed to opine about the 
problem of its general availability, but does not do so when she comments about 
the inadequacy of case law. There is no conscious acknowledgement of these 
external forces despite the sophisticated self-awareness of the limitation of cases. 
Accordingly, the “external pressures” explanation is less compelling. 
B. AMBIVALENCE
An alternative psychological paradigm to cognitive dissonance is the idea that it is 
not necessarily pathological, but rather potentially therapeutic, to feel or believe 
two contradictory things at the same time.266 This construct of ambivalence may 
better explain the tension in the books. On this interpretation, it is not simply 
that casebook editors “believe” in realism and “execute” convention, but rather 
that both ideas flow from distinct sets of genuinely held commitments. 
261. See e.g. ibid. Danzig’s work is referred to, although merely in passing, in Ben-Ishai & Percy 
9th ed, supra note 23 at 883.
262. See e.g. Douglas Leslie, “CaseFile Method,” online: <casefilemethod.com>.
263. See e.g. supra notes 194 & 195 (solicitor skills in Ben-Ishai & Percy). 
264. Boyle & Percy 7th ed, supra note 23 at 13.
265. See e.g. Interview of Instructor 042 (12 March 2013) at lines 105-12 (“the problem is 
that [cases are] really what we have in the public domain, but it’s misleading since by 
definition the case law describes pathological relationships … Our socio-legal friends tell 
us [that litigation occurs] something like one or two percent of commercial time, so what 
kind of lens or telescope or vantage point is this, really? The difficulty is that you can’t go 
on field trips inside of law firms to watch the constitution of contracts, the formation of 
contracts in action”). 
266. See LaPlanche & Pontalis, supra note 26 at 26ff, citing Sigmund Freud, Instincts and 
Their Vicissitudes.
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The best example of apparent ambivalence lies in the Milner Introduction. 
After so eloquently developing the idea that adjudication needs to be de-centred 
from legal education, Milner goes on to state that his “apology for so many cases 
is not quite abject, because first year law students are expected to learn thoroughly 
the judicial process, how and why it works and what its limitations are.”267 Why 
are law students “expected” to learn the judicial process? Does Milner feel this 
expectation is justified? He does not say. This lack of explanation implies that 
he is committed, perhaps subconsciously, to adjudication after all. One can 
infer a similar ambivalence in the Boyle/Ben-Ishai and Percy Introduction. The 
matter-of-fact way in which the editors announce that they prefer traditional 
methods and materials suggests a strong underlying commitment to them. 
One can easily read the casebooks and not gain the impression that the 
various argument-types surveyed are the product of a “wholesale assault on 
the jurisprudence of forms, concepts, and rules.”268 Instead, the overwhelming 
emphasis is the sustained commitment to forms, concepts, and rules and the 
simultaneous enchantment with the arguments that have debunked them.
If the co-presence of countervailing ideas is best explained by simultaneous 
commitment to contradictory beliefs, then the presence of ambivalence in 
Canadian legal thought deserves further inquiry. For example, the casebooks 
might suggest that in contrast with American legal thought, which is characterized 
by “methodological rivalry and generational rebellion expressed with polemic 
force,”269 the Canadian experience reveals a sensibility more inclined to toleration. 
Avenues for inquiry may include a return to early realist preoccupations with 
psychology270 and seek to deploy twenty-first century insights from cognitive 
science or even neuroscience to explore the nature of the law professor’s mind. 
Alternatively, explorations into Canadian legal culture could explore the extent 
to which the co-presence of multiple legal traditions271 may incline to a more 
ambi- or multi-valent conception of legal ideas.
267. Milner 1st ed, supra note 20 at xi. Cf Milner 2nd ed, supra note 20 at xxxi (expanding on 
themes of institutional competence and private normative arrangements to “protect the 
reader against an over-exposure to judicial opinions”).
268. Kennedy & Fisher, supra note 8 at 10.
269. Ibid at 3.
270. Frank, supra note 193.
271. For an example of the Supreme Court of Canada’s common practice of citing to diverse 
common law jurisdictions and to the Quebec civil law, even in a common law case, see 
Bhasin, supra note 175. On Canada’s identity as a “Métis nation,” see John Ralston Saul, 
A Fair Country: Telling Truths About Canada (Toronto: Penguin, 2008). For an example of 
Canada’s constitutional embrace of common and civil legal traditions, see Constitution Act, 
1867, s 92(13); Quebec Act of 1774, 14 Geo III c 83.
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C. RECONCILIATION
As pregnant as these avenues for further inquiry are, another characterization is 
plausible. This is the idea that Canadian legal thought may be characterized in a 
way that reconciles the commitment to realism and the commitment to “forms, 
concepts, and rules.”272 
1. A UNIFIED CONCEPTION: REALIST IDEAS SERVE THE RULE OF LAW
On a particular level, we might seek to reconcile the apparently disparate 
ideas via a unified philosophy of law. For example, when Waddams states in 
the preface to his textbook that “rational decision making is strengthened, not 
weakened, by open recognition of conflicting values,”273 he implies that realism 
furthers the goal of legal rationality. Put more fully: the rule-of-law value that 
law ought to treat everyone equally requires that there be rational distinctions 
to justify differential treatment. Adjudication is the pre-eminent legal process 
for cultivating this rationality, and thus should be focus of legal education. 
Understanding legal rationality requires not only understanding what judges say 
but also (not “instead”)274 what they do. As Waddams explains:
It is better to recognize competing values, even if that recognition appears to involve 
a difficult and uncertain balance, than to pursue certainty by adopting a rule that 
suppresses important countervailing principles. Such pursuit is self-defeating, for 
important values are rarely permanently suppressed. The rule that is supposed to 
achieve clarity and certainty becomes riddled with exceptions, judicial and statutory, 
devised to avoid injustice, and leads in the end to the loss of the very certainty that 
was supposed to be its chief merit.275
Accordingly, for a thinker such as Waddams, there may be no contradiction 
between a realistic tendency to understand underlying values and a desire for 
judicial rule-making to attain “certainty.”
In a similar vein, another editor, John McCamus, espouses the view that 
understanding underlying concerns directly serves the solidity of doctrine. 
272. This is the not the same as asking whether the ideas of legal realism and classical legal 
thought can be reconciled—which would be a jurisprudential problem of considerable 
difficulty. Instead, the question is whether there is a story or a characterization that can 
explain why having a commitment to each simultaneously neither represents acting opposed 
to one’s beliefs nor holding two contradictory ideas. 
273. Waddams, “Preface to the First Edition,” supra note 125 at viii.
274. Waddams, “Unconscionability in Contracts,” supra note 120 at 1.
275. Ibid at vii-viii [emphasis added].
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McCamus plays a major role in both Waddams and Boyle/Ben-Ishai and Percy.276 
He has also published the longest, and perhaps most widely recommended, 
contract law textbook in Canada.277 In the Preface to that book, he foregrounds 
the importance of doctrine: “The main objective … is to provide an accurate 
account of the principles and doctrines of the law of contract as it is currently 
understood and practiced in the common law provinces of Canada.”278 Yet, unlike 
other Canadian texts, whose prefaces and introductions paint a more formalist 
picture of the role of the treatise,279 McCamus emphasizes the common law’s 
“adaptability to changing social and economic circumstances and its ability to 
reformulate doctrine in light of evolving professional attitudes and insights as 
to how the law can be improved.”280 Although he aims not to “commingle the 
objectives of exposition and constructive criticism,”281 and is clearly concerned 
with more positivistic desires to “unravel the mysteries”282 of doctrines or “get to 
the bottom of things,”283 contract law’s underlying rationales seem integral to the 
very doctrine that his work attempts to elucidate.
This attitude is particularly apparent in the way McCamus describes his 
approach to teaching:
276. McCamus has edited the chapter on “Representations and Terms; Classification and 
Consequences” since the first edition of Boyle & Percy. He also edits a chapter in Waddams 
and contributes the subject of restitution to a “number of chapters.” Interview of John D 
McCamus (28 February 2014) at lines 527-30 (attributed with permission).
277. Compliments for the McCamus text proliferate in my interviews. It was the book that most 
professors recommended to students seeking clarity. 
278. John D McCamus, The Law of Contracts, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at xxiii 
[McCamus, Law of Contracts].
279. See GHL Fridman, The Law of Contract in Canada, 6th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2011) at 
v (revisions “ensure that [the text] reflects the true content of an area of the common law 
that is … logical but sometimes applied irrationally in order to achieve a just, fair, reasonable 
and commercially sound result” [emphasis added]), 1 (“vital difference between legal and 
moral obligations”); Bruce Macdougall, Introduction to Contracts, 2nd ed (Markham, Ont: 
LexisNexis, 2012) at vii (“This part of what is called the Law of Obligations is fortunate 
in having a certain unity and logic to it”). Nothing, however, compels a textbook writer 
to foreground doctrine or logic. See Angela Swan & Jakub Adamski, Canadian Contract 
Law, 3rd student ed (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis, 2012) at s 1.1 (“The belief that underlies 
this work is that the Canadian law of contracts exists to forward the values that underlie 
Canadian society”).
280. McCamus, Law of Contracts, supra note 278 at xxiii.
281. Ibid at xxiv.
282. Ibid.
283. Ibid at xxv. McCamus is here referring to the attitude of Allan Farnsworth, with whom 
McCamus once collaborated. 
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[It is important for students] to consider whether the doctrine does in fact have a 
solid foundation in public policy. If it doesn’t, it’s likely to change. If it does, it’s 
unlikely to change. …
I certainly tell the students that there’s no real distinction between law and public 
policy. Law is an exercise in developing, implementing, and applying public policy 
choices to social activity, commercial activity, of various kinds. … [Understanding 
the … basic architecture of the doctrine of promissory estoppel and what the 
problems with it are … no doubt rests on the analysis of why would we give some 
effect to a promise that’s relied upon—and was intended to be relied upon. … The 
two analytical tasks are quite deeply related and it’s never been my view that you 
could somehow teach the law without thinking about the policy aspects of it.284 
Accordingly, the underlying factors of policy and context (“changing social and 
economic circumstances”) are considered not as a challenge to, but directly in 
service of, doctrine. As with Waddams, realistic insights serve to buttress the 
formalist demands of a “solid” doctrine. This interpretation reconciles the 
commitment to two apparently contradictory views. The “basic” commitment 
is that the rule of law requires that (1) there be a solid body of rules that (2) 
are applied equally to all people, requiring (3) a well-refined rationality to 
justify differential treatment in similar circumstances. (4) This rationality is best 
refined and developed through judicial reasoning; thus, its study should be the 
predominant activity of legal education. Realistic attitudes are important not 
because they challenge these tenets, but because they serve them: by elucidating 
and sharpening judicial reasoning and rationality, and by ensuring that the rules 
are “solidly founded.” 
This interpretation may very well explain some of the apparently contradictory 
statements in the casebooks, and it may also capture the attitudes of some law 
teachers. Nevertheless, it is unlikely to fit the bill in all instances. The realist project, 
recall, was a “wholesale assault”285 on classical legal thought. In its purest form, 
it serves to destabilize, not solidify, “forms, concepts, and rules.”286 Accordingly, 
this rule-of-law explanation likely does not fully account for instances of strong 
critical perspectives, such as those in the Boyle/Ben-Ishai and Percy Introductions. 
Even if the intellectually ambitious project of reconciling realism and formalism 
were possible, it likely would not explain all instances of apparent contradiction 
in Canadian contract law casebooks. A broader characterization of legal thought 
may be required.
284. Interview of John D McCamus, supra note 276 at lines 218-45.
285. Kennedy & Fisher, supra note 8 at 10 [emphasis added].
286. Ibid.
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2. METHODOLOGICAL HOMOGENEITY AND THEORETICAL ECLECTICISM 
The foregoing review of the Canadian contract law casebooks points the way 
to such a characterization. Whereas in the United States, legal reasoning may 
accurately be described as an “eclectic practice built from the methodological 
sediment laid down by successive projects of wholesale criticism and reform,”287 
and law as a “practice of arguments learned, made, developed over time, accepted, 
and rejected,”288 in Canada, methodological homogeneity prevails. As outlined 
above, in both Waddams and Boyle/Ben-Ishai and Percy the skill of identifying 
relevant differences through hypothetical fact scenarios predominates.289 And 
even Swan, whose solicitor’s perspective serves as counterpoint to the other two 
books, includes a good number of such examples, suggesting that reasoning by 
example has a centre of gravity around which even the most critical Canadian 
perspectives revolve.290
At the same time, Canadian contract law casebooks do evidence an 
eclecticism, but on scrutiny, this remains at the level of theory, not methodology. 
Instead of marshaling the various realist and critical theories to construct a series 
of diverse argument-types for the lawyer’s “eclectic toolkit,”291 they serve as either 
a gloss on, or foil for, the one dominant mode of argumentation—reasoning by 
analogy. The “Perspectives” chapter in Waddams, which “reflects a lively interest 
… in the theory of contract law,” is an excellent illustration of the tendency.292 
While the assembly of theories is impressive and diverse, changing over time with 
successive editions, it functions very much as a standalone. The editors do not 
appear to draw explicit connections between these readings and the substantive 
content in later chapters.293 
A similar tendency surfaces in Boyle/Ben-Ishai and Percy. Editors of the 
individual chapters do not appear to incorporate the critical perspectives from 
the meticulously recrafted introduction into the substantive chapters. Such was 
Devlin’s critique of the fifth edition, and it continues to apply today. As noted 
287. Ibid at 3.
288. Ibid at 8.
289. Supra notes 201 & 202. 
290. See e.g. Swan 9th ed, supra note 21 at ss 2.204 (“Should the rules for damages differentiate 
between dogs and stereos?”), 2.143, 2.267, 2.475.
291. Kennedy & Fisher, supra note 8 at 3.
292. Waddams 5th ed, supra note 22 at iii [emphasis added].
293. See e.g. ibid at 112, question 5 (“B replies that he could not so treat an old and valued 
customer”). Instead of connecting the theme of relational contracting raised by the quoted 
material to the Macaulay reading in Chapter 1, the student is merely asked to “Advise A,” 
with reference to another case.
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above, “policy” questions are often vague, whereas students are repeatedly asked 
to compare and distinguish cases and to create or respond to hypotheticals and 
counterfactuals.294 As in Waddams, editors occasionally forfeit the opportunity to 
take up interesting policy questions in favour of conventional legal reasoning.295 
The implication is that critical perspectives primarily provide fodder for loose 
commentary, whereas analogical reasoning deserves repeated drilling and 
refining.296 Moreover, even critics like Devlin emphasize “theory” as a virtue, 
without referencing any desire to operationalize theory into diverse forms of legal 
argumentation.297 “Doing Theory in First Year Contracts” becomes posited as the 
aspirational goal.298 
The casebooks thus suggest that Canadian legal thought may express a 
commitment to theoretical eclecticism and methodological homogeneity. 
Although a wide variety of critical perspectives are admitted into the canon of 
contract law teaching, they are not permitted to inform the core methodology of 
what it means to think like a lawyer. None of the casebooks seems to take seriously 
the idea that different substantive ideas about law imply different methods of 
legal reasoning and argumentation.299 Consigned mainly to “theory,” critical 
perspectives are relegated to the margins in a way that encourages some contract 
law teachers to devalue policy reasoning by treating it as “free-form,” “anecdotal,” 
or “speculative” in contrast to the “tight, technical” exercise of “correct legal 
reading.”300 This marginalization may not be intended: the commitments to the 
critical ideas in the casebooks appear genuine. But a powerful and monolithic 
understanding of legal methodology frustrates their penetration into what 
294. See supra notes 214, 215, 201 & 202.
295. See supra note 213.
296. Cf Mertz, supra note 2 at 76-77.
297. Devlin, supra note 19 at 148 (“we should … address issues of theory from day one”).
298. Devlin, Duggan & Langevin, supra note 236 (title).
299. Compare Daniel Markovits, Contract Law and Legal Methods (New York: Foundation Press, 
2012) at xi, 19:
Contract Law and Legal Methods aims to avoid the intellectual and pedagogic sins that 
conventional casebooks invite. It [pursues] this ambition by embracing Langdell’s great 
insight—that the generic structure of a teaching text should fit the conceptual structure of the 
subject taught—in the shadow of modern ideas about the nature of law…
The economic focus of the treatment of contract remedies … should be approached as a case study, 
designed to illustrate one among several methods of legal analysis, which sometimes converge and 
sometimes compete, and whose relative influence is always a contentious matter. The economic 
analysis of contract remedies…provides a useful introduction to interdisciplinary legal methods 
more generally, by illustrating what a successful interdisciplinary approach to law looks like. 
300. Mertz, supra note 2 at 75-77.
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activities and thinking skills are considered and taught as “legal.” Simply put, 
in Canada, contract law editors do not translate their theoretical eclecticism into 
methodological pluralism.
3. PEDAGOGICAL EFFECTIVENESS
There is yet another lens through which one can view the co-existence of realist 
and formalist messages in casebooks. Up until now, I have analyzed the books 
as artifacts, parsing their words to elucidate implicit and explicit messages that 
they communicate about law and legal reasoning. But these books are not just 
artifacts; they are also tools for teaching. Thus, it is also important to consider 
how the casebook editors may have envisioned their actual use by instructors. 
Doing so suggests we may reconcile the apparent contradiction between realist 
and formalist views in two possible ways. 
On the one hand, the Boyle/Ben-Ishai and Percy and Waddams editors might 
intend for the theoretical perspectives to be incorporated into the course material, 
and would be pleased if they were to be integrated into a more eclectic vision 
of legal reasoning. Their reticence to do so themselves may simply reflect their 
view of the appropriate allocation of responsibility between editor and instructor: 
Unlike Swan, which advances one central argument, their approach is to leave it to 
individual professors to accomplish these tasks in the way they deem fit. On this 
view, the marginalization of policy and the relegation of critical perspectives 
to the un-operationalized domain of “theory” is not the intended end, but the 
unfinished work of the casebook—a waystation en route to classroom experience. 
This interpretation is certainly plausible. At minimum, the editors of both 
books emphasize that the books are designed as teaching tools, meant to serve 
a wide variety of approaches.301 Moreover, the Boyle/Ben-Ishai and Percy editors 
specifically highlight the role of the instructor in promoting “critical reflection.”302 
The fact that some law professors actually do attempt to incorporate the material 
from the introductory chapters into later substantive areas also suggests that the 
301. See Ben-Ishai & Percy 9th ed, supra note 23 at vi (“The book continues to be designed 
primarily as a teaching tool … [W]e do not attempt to imbue the reader with a particular 
philosophy. … Rather we try to note a number of different approaches to contracts 
throughout and to leave scope for individual teachers to pursue their own themes with these 
materials as a solid base”); Waddams 5th ed, supra note 22 at iii (“[W]e have designed it to be 
suitable for dealing with the material in several different orders. … We hope that all will find 
the book equally suitable for their purposes”).
302. Ben-Ishai & Percy 9th ed, supra note 23 at 1-2 (“Your own instructor will direct you to and 
discuss with you the writings that he or she feels will best promote critical reflection on the 
basic material reproduced here”).
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casebooks may serve this function.303 Moreover, as I have developed elsewhere, 
it is quite common for professors to claim that they are exposing students to 
a wide range of theories in order to cultivate a diverse series of arguments.304 
As one professor explains, a “convincing” argument is one that “is going to be 
some combination of legal impact, policy effect, and values.”305 The fact that the 
casebooks do not directly operationalize critical perspectives into argumentative 
practices may not preclude their ability to serve instructors’ desires to do so. 
Indeed, this delegation of responsibility between editor and instructor may be an 
effective pedagogical design to accomplish this end.
On the other hand, it is equally plausible that the editors conceive of the 
casebooks’ pedagogical role as emphasizing the “core” status of doctrinal rules 
and analogical reasoning. On this view, critical perspectives are important to 
understand, but really secondary to the “basics.” The marginalization of policy 
and theory in the books is a concretization of this pedagogical belief. This attitude 
surfaces in the words of the editors, who describe their books as being “designed 
to constitute the basis of a core course in contracts,”306 or as a “collection of 
materials suitable for the basic course in the subject.”307 This interpretation is 
303. See e.g. Interview of Instructor 009 (26 September 2013) at lines 222-48 (incorporating 
critical perspectives from Ben-Ishai & Percy into class discussion). However, it must also be 
noted that a good proportion of instructors do not assign the introductory or perspectives 
chapters of the books. Based on syllabi, six instructors do not assign the Waddams 
perspectives chapter, as opposed to three who do. By contrast, seven instructors do not assign 
the introductory chapter in Boyle/Ben-Ishai & Percy, whereas seventeen do. Interestingly, 
one instructor who teaches from Swan assigns the Waddams perspective chapter. The theme 
comes up occasionally in interview. See Interview of Instructor 048 (16 July 2014) at lines 
393-413; Interview of Instructor 025 (10 April 2014) at lines 443-45 (does not assign the 
Waddams Perspectives Chapter).
304. David Sandomierski, “Theory and Practice, Together At Last: A Heretical, Empirical Account 
of Canadian Legal Education” in Meera Deo, Mindie Lazarus-Black & Elizabeth Mertz, eds, 
Legal Education Across Borders (Routledge) [forthcoming in 2018].
305. Interview of Instructor 064 (22 October 2015) at lines 584-86. See also Interview of 
Instructor 033 (9 April 2014) at line 480 (specifically cultivating the ability to make 
arguments by randomly assigning students positions based on themes of class, race, and 
power). Despite these claims, however, I demonstrate elsewhere that, for the most part, 
contract law professors predominantly do not succeed at truly operationalizing their 
critical and realist commitments into eclectic methods of reasoning. For the most part, 
they emphasize the conventional reasoning focused on rules and analogical reasoning that 
the casebooks do. See David Sandomierski, Theory & Practice, Realism & Formalism, and 
Aspiration & Reality in Canadian Contract Law Teaching (SJD Thesis, University of Toronto 
Faculty of Law, 2017) [unpublished], c  5.
306. Ben-Ishai & Percy 9th ed, supra note 23 at vi.
307. Waddams 5th ed, supra note 22 at iii.
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further supported by the fairly common tendency of contract law professors 
to produce their own supplements in order to highlight critical perspectives308 
or to counteract the perceived shortcomings of the casebooks.309
Which is the more accurate view? Certainly, among contract law professors, 
the answer is one of diversity and pluralism. The very survival in the marketplace of 
Swan makes any sweeping generalization impossible: Many instructors specifically 
use Swan because its overarching argument enables them to operationalize ideas 
of legal realism into practice and diverse modes of legal thinking.310 Nevertheless, 
the majority market share of the other two books, the fact that their editors come 
from almost every common law Canadian law school, and the fact that the books 
undergo regular restructuring and editing, suggest that the dominant messages of 
308. See e.g. Interview of Instructor 009, supra note 303 at lines 106-49. Of the 58 professors who 
assigned a commercial casebook, 21 assigned supplementary materials that included scholarly 
articles. An additional 11 professors assigned supplementary materials that focused primarily 
on additional cases or references to short pieces of legislation.
309. See e.g. Interview of Instructor 006 (25 February 2013) at lines at 67-124 (insufficient 
problems and exercises in all Canadian casebooks); Interview of Instructor 010 (6 June 
2013) at lines 200-43 (providing more contemporary examples than in Ben-Ishai & Percy to 
appeal to students’ sense of relevance); Interview of Instructor 021 (9 April 2014) at lines 
556-608 (filling in key moments missed when some cases taken out of Ben-Ishai & Percy); 
Interview of Instructor 017, supra note 142 at lines 109-203 (providing more context, more 
contemporarily relevant examples, and more gendered material than in Waddams); Interview 
of Instructor 027 (9 May 2014) at lines 621-49 (providing extended excerpts to teach the 
cases more as “parables” in contrast to the editing in Waddams that “strip[s] the guts out of 
cases”); Interview of Instructor 033, supra note 305 at lines 240-56, 324-57 (supplementing 
the “weak section on the … explicit role of public policy and morality” in Ben-Ishai & Percy, 
and exposing students to the themes of “sex, race, and power” in a more detailed way than 
the introduction does); Interview of Instructor 035 (4 March 2014) at lines 616-37 (without 
a “conscious effort” to include “big picture issues,” they would be missed because Ben-Ishai 
& Percy “doesn’t really raise those issues at all … and that would be one of my minor 
disappointments”). Occasionally, instructors feel the need to supplement Swan, too. See e.g. 
Interview of Instructor 016 (5 June 2013) at lines 741-47.
310. See e.g. Interview of Instructor 013 (29 May 2013) at lines 55-87, 111-24: 
the Swan and Reiter book … make[s] decisions based on a complex matrix of things including 
the facts, their … response to the facts, motivated by concerns about fairness, and then using 
legal argumentation to support the conclusion. … I think that that is a much more accurate 
way of describing what courts do and how judges actually do make decisions, and therefore 
if you’re trying as a lawyer to either predict what’s going to happen in a case, or you’re trying 
to put together an argument with a view to determining what’s going to happen in a case, 
or you’re drafting a contract with a view to trying to achieve a specific legal result, you need to 
take into account all of those things.”
 See also Interview of Instructor 023 (24 April 2014) at lines 315-26.
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the casebooks do illustrate a widespread viewpoint. This viewpoint surfaces in the 
ideas expressed by a number of professors that “critical” perspectives are a tertiary 
concern after acquiring “knowledge of the rules” and “legal reasoning skills.”311 
A good number underemphasize or altogether eschew critique, on the grounds 
that one cannot productively be critical until one knows the “basics.”312 
The idea that the casebooks are primarily a launching pad for instructors 
to realize their own desired ends may be too simplistic and disregard the 
integral role that the books play in the construction of legal consciousness.313 
As artifacts, casebooks capture and reflect the attitudes of their editors, who are 
teachers themselves. As pedagogical tools, they structure and guide the way that 
instructors teach the course. Many of these instructors are not specialists, and 
may be inclined to defer to the methodological and substantive guidance of 
the expert editors.314 Moreover, many professors do not engage in a systematic 
review of the casebooks prior to selecting them; informal pressure to adopt 
311. See e.g. Interview of Instructor 026 (24 April 2014) at lines 201-49 (just mentioning the 
first two); Interview of Instructor 050 (2 June 2014) at lines 37-57; Interview of Instructor 
022 (19 February 2014) at lines 403-35; Interview of Instructor 038 (20 May 2014) at lines 
91-134; Interview of Instructor 011 (date redacted) at lines 57-70.
312. See e.g. Interview of Instructor 006, supra note 309 at line 308; Interview of Instructor 
030 (27 March 2014) at line 121; Interview of Instructor 054 (9 May 2014) at line 923; 
Interview of Instructor 059 (23 July 2014) at line 292; Interview of Instructor 039 (8 June 
2014) at lines 609, 641. 
313. Cf Angela Fernandez & Markus D Dubber, eds, Law Books In Action: Essays on the 
Anglo-American Legal Treatise (Oxford: Hart, 2012). 
314. See e.g. Interview of Instructor 021, supra note 309 at lines 549-54 (“[Boyle/Ben-Ishai & 
Percy] was the book that was being used here. … When I did my graduate work, contract law 
was not my area. So … I said, ‘What’s the easiest path of resistance here?’ And I picked up 
that book”); Interview of Instructor 062 (16 May 2014) lines 815-17 (“I was loath to make 
any changes. I didn’t remove anything because I thought, ‘Who am I to remove something? 
If [the editor] thinks it’s relevant, I’m going to keep it’”); Interview of Instructor 026, 
supra note 311 at lines 587-603 (“I thought about making my own syllabus, but I hadn’t 
studied law in Canada. … For my commercial law course … I did design my own syllabus, 
and it was an enormous amount of work. … I didn’t want to do that for a first year course 
for … I was a totally inexperienced teacher. … So I wanted to use one of the established 
casebooks”); Interview of Instructor 051 (16 July 2014) at lines 194-99 (“I’d never taught 
Contracts before and … trying to reinvent the wheel when you’re in your first year teaching 
is as I’ve learned from experience, … generally a good idea. It’s better to … take … what’s 
there and … then decide what you want to change”).
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the “house” book is often too hard to resist.315 Sunk costs are also an issue: 
it is relatively rare for instructors to change books.316 Accordingly, these books 
not only provide a template around which instructors may design a course, 
they communicate authoritative understandings about the “core” substance and 
methodology of contract law. Given this entangled function of reflecting and 
315. The professors who spoke about the process of selecting a casebook overwhelmingly adopted 
the “house book.” Of these, nineteen (Professors 6, 11, 16, 17, 21, 26, 33, 35, 38, 45, 51, 
54, 57, 59, 61, 65, and 66) described their decisions as being motivated by wanting to have 
consistency with fellow instructors, as wanting to draw on colleagues’ experience, or simply 
not wanting to “buck” the trend. By contrast, only one (Professor 26) described reviewing 
all three casebooks in detail prior to teaching the course the first time. See e.g. Interview 
of Instructor 017, supra note 142 at lines 552-64 (“I was going to try to use Angela Swan’s 
… but I felt as a starting person, ‘No—I can’t do that! I have to use the house book.’ … 
Because I have … no credibility. … [I]t’s very difficult I think when you’re first starting 
out to buck”). Most of the time, the pressure was only informal, but in one case there was 
a specific intervention by the Dean to adopt the house book. See Interview of Instructor 
041 (date redacted) at lines 555-59 (“The Dean … came to me and said, ‘Okay, you’re the 
only one who’s not—you’re the junior person. You don’t want to be … seen as being different 
unless you’re really committed to it. So are you really committed to it?’ And I said, ‘No, not 
particularly’”). 
316. Only thirteen professors described changing casebooks, or indicated an intention to do so (of 
these, only two (Professors 25 and 51) indicated having tried all three). The overwhelming 
impression is that most professors choose one casebook and stick with it, often because of 
the investment made. See e.g. Interview of Instructor 017, supra note 142 at lines 572-83 
(“What I think can sometimes happen, is that, so you’ve been doing it a certain way—you 
just keep doing it that way because it’s just way easier and you can spend your time on other 
things”); Interview of Instructor 065 (11 April 2015) at lines 136-38 (“to be honest with 
you, [Ben-Ishai & Percy] wasn’t my selection, and it’s just been more a product of the fact that 
that is now the casebook that I’ve used and will going forward”). Some professors indicated 
a commitment to alternating casebooks in order to seek a better fit with their convictions 
about law, or to keep things fresh for students, but these seemed to be exceptions that proved 
the rule. See e.g. Interview of Instructor 013, supra note 310 at lines 55-78 
(I had a long conversation with John Swan, as he then was, and he convinced me. He said to 
me something that resonated to me based on my experience in practice which was that the 
issues that we focus [on] … in the Boyle and Percy approach … put emphasis on the wrong 
things— … technical issues of contract formation which in the vast majority of cases … are 
not issues at all. And that the much more complex and indeed for that reason socially important 
… issues are issues related to damages, and remedies more generally. … I decided … that I 
would investigate using his book and after looking at it, was convinced that it was a better 
tool for teaching contracts to students in a way that would allow them to appreciate not only 
what was important about contracts, but … would give them a better sense of the nature of 
contract law rules); 
 Interview of Instructor 025, supra note 303 at lines 302-303 (“I just think [switching 
casebooks is] a good thing to do. To some extent it shakes up the students a little”).
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constituting legal consciousness, the casebooks’ tendency toward homogenous 
methodology combined with theoretical eclecticism may have a great deal to say 
about Canadian legal thought more generally.
 CONCLUSION: BACK TO THE FUTURE
Canadian casebooks can at times seem curiously anachronistic. Continual 
refinements have brought in contemporary examples but have not fundamentally 
changed the perspectival framing of the books, which came of age in the late 
1970s. The dominant theoretical framing remains the realist attack on the classical 
consensus, with a dose of seasoning from later schools of thought sprinkled 
throughout. The tension between these influences and the conventional execution 
was identified a generation ago, with the invocation that “issues raised in the  
introduction” should be better “integrated into the discussion of doctrine.”317 
After a generation of minimal progress on this front, today’s challenges are 
analogous, but much more thoroughgoing. My analysis of the casebooks suggests 
three avenues for remedial inquiry and response.
A. INCORPORATING THEORETICAL ECLECTICISM INTO LEGAL 
METHODOLOGY
If the desire is to consistently carry through the commitments of American Legal 
Realism and its heirs, then at minimum Canadian casebook editors ought to 
confront the challenge of incorporating their theoretical commitments into a 
broader view of what constitutes legal reasoning and methodology. Consciousness 
about conflicting values, unequal treatment of persons according to class, race, 
and gender, economic behaviour, and injustice ought to be operationalized into a 
rigorous set of policy and argumentative skills and treated as core elements of the 
lawyer’s “eclectic toolkit.” Inspiration may be sought from other casebooks that 
attempt to do this explicitly.318
B. AN EXPLICIT DEFENCE
Alternatively, editors may wish to confront, acknowledge, and defend a 
commitment to methodological homogeneity. A strong rule-of-law argument, 
akin to the one imputed to Waddams and McCamus above, could serve to justify 
a focus on legal rationality. It could be defended as consistent with theoretical 
317. Manwaring, supra note 19 at 785.
318. See e.g. Markovits, supra note 299.
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eclecticism on the grounds that operationalizing theoretical commitments into 
methodological practice risks instrumentalizing and diluting these powerful 
critiques, and that the theories should be preserved pure for the social purpose 
of critique. This avenue would have the virtue of bringing any background 
commitments to the fore, so that they may be subject to conscious scrutiny and 
scholarly debate. 
C. A THIRD WAY: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING CONTRACT LAW
There is a third option. This is to acknowledge the natural limits of teaching 
contract law using judicial decisions and to transend them via a wholesale project 
of pedagogical reform. Specifically, a new set of materials could be designed 
around, as the Boyle and Percy editors initially suggested in 1981, “empirically 
recurring problems for contracting parties.”319 Such a set of materials would shift 
the focus away from the rules and legal reasoning found in decided cases toward 
the actual practices and norms involved in everyday contracting. The prevailing 
metaphor for the contract law casebook—a portable law library320—could 
be reimagined into a version of field notes that capture, or a field guide that 
structures, empirical observations of contract law in action.321 
Such a model would have a number of virtues. The sociological approach 
could contribute to bringing critical, policy, and other perspectives into the 
core of legal reasoning. Empirical examples would expose students to concrete 
illustrations of injustice and systemic barriers to the law’s pursuit of fairness. 
The policy choices and problem-solving skills needed to confront these issues 
would appear as pressing and relevant to what law is (and lawyers are) meant 
to do. Second, such materials could make the Fullerian goal of producing social 
architects via an emphasis on multiple legal processes more attainable. In the 
United States, at least, attempts to embody methodological pluralism, even 
319. Boyle & Percy 2nd ed, supra note 23 at 14 lviii. The benefits of such an approach were floated 
even earlier. See Milner 1st ed, supra note 20 at xvi (“We are, I think, still lagging behind 
the other social sciences in our study of the law-in-action, yet that is where the functional 
analysis receives its only important testing”).
320. See Milner 1st ed, supra note 20 at vii; Bruce Kimball, “Langdell on Contracts and Legal 
Reasoning: Correcting the Holmesian Caricature” (2007) 25:2 Law & Hist Rev 345 at 348.
321. Cf Interview of Instructor 042, supra note 265 at lines 110-12, 640-45 (“The difficulty is 
that you can’t go on field trips inside of law firms to watch the constitution of contracts, the 
formation of contracts, in action. … Take the field trip to Bay Street, and as often as not, 
you’ll find folks engaged in long-term planning exercises, not adjudicative exercises, in respect 
of which—drafting a will, or incorporating a company, or preparing a trust instrument, 
or negotiating a contract, or doing tax planning—the role of law is invisible”). 
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when explicitly highlighting legislative processes, are still curiously intertwined 
with appellate case law.322 A set of sociological legal materials could disrupt 
this tendency. 
Moreover, this embrace of “process” pluralism could lead to a more robust 
legal pluralism. In one respect, focusing on real contracting behaviour could 
highlight parties’ private normative systems, and suggest to students that their 
“toolkit” should include the ability to identify and navigate alternate normative 
environments, deploying versatile skills and strategies to diverse situations.323 
In another respect, de-centring state normativity may have the effect of making 
other legal traditions more visible in, and relevant to, “core” contract study. 
In this regard, a sociological set of contract materials could help incorporate 
Indigenous perspectives and traditions into the Contract Law course—for 
example, by studying exchange practices in traditional communities, the effects 
on planning and exchange caused by changes to restrictions on reserve land 
ownership,324 or the distinctive practices of negotiation and interpretation of 
treaties325—consistent with the spirit of Recommendations 27 and 28 of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada.326 
The challenges of producing such a set of materials are real, not the least 
of which is the cost and difficulty of obtaining proprietary and confidential 
information that might accurately reflect parties’ actual negotiating practices. But 
better to confront these barriers than to acquiesce to the veiled power of inertia 
and the subconscious. Over a century has passed since the realist invitation to 
322. See e.g. Markovits, supra note 299 (focusing on appellate cases in a methodologically plural 
approach to contract law); John F Manning & Matthew Stephenson, eds, Legislation and 
Regulation (New York: Foundation Press, 2010) (a casebook format for the new course of 
the same title). See also Kennedy & Fisher, supra note 8 at 5 (“it continues to be true that 
‘thinking like a lawyer’ means thinking like an appellate judge”).
323. Cf Interview of Instructor 042, supra note 265 at lines 79-95:
I try to persuade students that contract is a dynamic and forward-looking mode of social 
ordering and that therefore it’s a course about lawyers’ involvement in the construction of 
little legal systems, each time they negotiate a contract. And although it’s a planning exercise, 
a dynamic forward-looking exercise, there are all kinds of really good skills that are grounded in 
law, but are nonetheless skills. So, negotiation, figuring out how much to say when and where, 
determining how many of a client’s instructions should be acted upon, and later on, maybe, 
having to convert a deliberately ambiguous or informal arrangement into codified form.
324. See Jobs and Growth Act, 2012, RSC 2012, c 31 (5th Supp), ss 206-209.
325. On this last point, see Boyle & Percy 7th ed, supra note 23 at 11 (a passage removed in the 
eight edition).
326. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Calls to Action (Winnipeg, MB: Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015) at 3.
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move from “law in books” to “law in action.”327 While Canadian casebook editors 
explicitly and consciously pledge allegiance to this idea, the “digestion” of realism 
into the academy is by no means “complete.”328 A serious effort to “do” what is 
“said” might enable the next generation of law teachers and students to unleash 
the full potential of Canadian contract law teaching. 
327. See Pound, supra note 28.
328. Konefsky et al, supra note 28, cited in Gerber, supra note 35 at 627.

